

LANDMINE MONITOR

2019



20-YEAR REVIEW

International **TO BAN**
CAMPAIGN
LANDMINES

1997 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate

LANDMINE MONITOR

2019

21ST ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
DanChurchAid • Danish Demining Group • Human Rights Watch
Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor2@icblcmc.org.

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Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.

PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers' fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to sustainable development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don't bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working within Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children's rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL's membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel

mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

The ICBL's efforts to ban landmines have led to a whole new approach called humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society campaigns and has led to four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.

In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the *de facto* monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and an annual report. A network of more than two-dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL's campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 21st annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. *Landmine Monitor 2019* provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

As well as a twenty-year review, this report focuses on mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action for calendar year 2018, with information included up to November 2019 when possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for all their crucial assistance.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee's members include: DanChurchAid (Dennis Solberg Kjeldsen), Danish Demining Group (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Morgan McKenna (Monitor program manager), and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC Director). From January to October 2019, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2019. The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham, Jacquelyn Kantack, and Keenan Danehey;
- Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Ruth Bottomley and Marion Loddo; and,
- Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Jennifer Reeves, Farzana Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore, Marianne Schulze, and Clémentine Tavernier.

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* *List accurate as of November 2019.*

** *Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.*

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	battle area clearance
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
DPO	disabled persons' organization
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ERW	explosive remnants of war
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO	unexploded ordnance

GLOSSARY

Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

Non-state armed groups (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2019

Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2019

Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2019

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
Bahamas	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	St. Kitts & Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Dominica	St. Vincent & the
Dominican Rep.	Grenadines
Ecuador	Suriname
El Salvador	Trinidad & Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	Venezuela
Cuba	United States

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Bangladesh	Niue
Bhutan	Palau
Brunei Darussalam	Papua New Guinea
Cambodia	Philippines
Cook Islands	Samoa
Fiji	Solomon Islands
Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Japan	Thailand
Kiribati	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tuvalu
Maldives	Vanuatu
Marshall Islands	
China	Mongolia
India	Myanmar
Korea, North	Nepal
Korea, South	Pakistan
Lao PDR	Singapore
Micronesia, Fed States of	Tonga
	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Greece	Norway
Andorra	Holy See	Poland
Austria	Hungary	Portugal
Belarus	Iceland	Romania
Belgium	Ireland	San Marino
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Italy	Serbia
Bulgaria	Latvia	Slovakia
Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Cyprus	Lithuania	Spain
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Sweden
Denmark	Macedonia, North	Switzerland
Estonia	Malta	Tajikistan
Finland	Moldova	Turkey
France	Monaco	Turkmenistan
Germany	Montenegro	Ukraine
	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Russia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Georgia		

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Kuwait	Qatar
Iraq	Oman	Tunisia
Jordan	Palestine	Yemen
Bahrain	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Iran	Morocco	
Israel	Saudi Arabia	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Eswatini	Niger
Benin	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Botswana	Gabon	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Gambia	São Tomé & Príncipe
Burundi	Ghana	Senegal
Cameroon	Guinea	Seychelles
Cape Verde	Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Somalia
Chad	Lesotho	South Africa
Comoros	Liberia	South Sudan
Congo, Rep.	Madagascar	Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Malawi	Tanzania
Dem. Rep. Congo	Mali	Togo
Djibouti	Mauritania	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Zambia
Eritrea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
	Namibia	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAJOR FINDINGS	1
BAN POLICY	7
7 Banning Antipersonnel Mines	
8 Use of Antipersonnel Landmines	
14 Universalizing the Landmine Ban	
15 Production of Antipersonnel Mines	
16 Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines	
17 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines	
18 Stockpile Destruction by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties	
19 Mines Retained for Training and Research (Article 3)	
21 Transparency Reporting	
23 1997 Mine Ban Treaty: Status 2018	
CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE	25
25 Antipersonnel mine contamination	
33 Addressing the impact through treaty implementation	
39 Challenges and opportunities to achieving clearance obligations	
51 Mine Contamination: Status 2019	
CASUALTIES	53
53 Overview	
58 Casualty demographics	
58 Mine/ERW types resulting in casualties	
64 Landmine, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and Cluster Submunition Casualties in 2018	
VICTIM ASSISTANCE	67
72 Victim assistance and the Oslo Action Plan	
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION	83
83 2018 Figures and Trends	
84 International Contributions in 2018	
92 National Contributions in 2018	
92 Five-Year Support to Mine Action 2014–2018	
95 Support for Mine Action: 2018	
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION	97
97 Treat Status	
100 Mine Ban Treaty	



A female deminer working on particularly difficult terrain for mine clearance activities in Colombia.

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MAJOR FINDINGS

The resounding success of the campaign to ban landmines has led to an entirely new approach called humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society and has led to four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.

Landmine Monitor 2019, a twenty-year review and the 21st annual edition, continues to monitor the inexorable progress toward a mine-free world. The stigma against landmines remains strong. Despite no states joining in the reporting period, 164 countries are bound by and are dutifully implementing the treaty's provisions, with most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty abiding nonetheless by its key provisions.

Only a small number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) use the banned weapon, often in the form of improvised mines. These have again resulted in a high number of casualties in 2018, with the majority of victims being civilians, more than half of whom were children. As countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land, the Monitor identifies much that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their communities. Countries both within and without the regime are contributing significant resources toward mine clearance and other mine action activities, affirming the impact that this first humanitarian disarmament treaty continues to have after more than two decades.

TREATY STATUS

There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; the Marshall Islands is the last signatory that has yet to ratify.

- The most recent countries to join the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine in December 2017.

USE

From mid-2018 through October 2019, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period: Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen.

- There were as yet unconfirmed allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Colombia, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Somalia, and Tunisia.

CASUALTIES

2018 was the fourth year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of recorded casualties due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)—including improvised types that act as antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and other ERW.

- In 2018, the Monitor recorded 6,897 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW—3,059 people were killed, 3,837 people were injured, and for one casualty the survival status was unknown.
- The continuing high total was influenced by casualties recorded in countries facing armed conflict and large-scale violence, particularly Afghanistan, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine. Accurate data gathering for active conflicts, however, remains challenging.
- Although the 2018 total was less than those of the three previous years, it was still almost double the lowest determined annual number of 3,457 casualties in 2013.
- For the third consecutive year, in 2018, the highest number of annual casualties was caused by improvised mines (3,789). This was also the year with the most improvised mine casualties recorded to date.

Casualties in 2018 were identified in 50 states and other areas, of which 32 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and in three other areas.

- The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (71%) where their status was known, a slight decrease in the ratio over recent years.
- In 2018, children accounted for 54% of all civilian casualties where the age was known, an increase of seven percentage points from the 2017 annual total, and 12 percentage points in 2016.
- As in previous years, in 2018, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (84%).
- The Monitor has recorded more than 130,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global tracking began in 1999, including some 90,000 survivors.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US\$699.5 million in **combined** international and national support for mine action in 2018, a decrease of \$95.1 million (12%) compared to 2017.

- This represents the second-highest combined total of international and national mine action funding ever reported in Monitor data, going back to 1996.

In 2018, **international donors** contributed \$642.6 million to mine action in 43 states and three other areas, a decrease of \$53.7 million (8%) compared with 2017.

- This puts an end to the two years of sustained growth observed in 2016 and 2017, while still representing the second-highest level of international support ever recorded by the Monitor.
- The top five mine action donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Germany—contributed 71% of all international funding, with a combined total of \$458.1 million.
- Mine action in five states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia, and Lao PDR—received \$351.2 million, or 55% of all international support in 2018.

- International support for victim assistance in 17 countries as well as global activities totaled \$44.7 million in 2018, compared to \$27.7 million in 2017.
 - Although this represents an increase in volume of \$17 million (61%), as a proportion of all international support provided it remains near the upper end of the 4–7% range observed since 2013.
 - Half of all dedicated victim assistance went to just four countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria; while a continuous decline was recorded for most of the other recipients (nine out of the 17 recipients of victim assistance funding received less support in 2018 compared to 2017).
 - Donor support explicitly dedicated to victim assistance remains difficult to track and improved reporting on the allocation of international support by donors was still needed.

The Monitor identified only eight affected states that reported providing \$56.9 million in **national support** for their own mine action programs, a decrease of \$41.4 million (42%) compared with 2017.

CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

Sixty states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 2019. There has been no change from 2018.

- This includes 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and four other areas.
- No State Party completed clearance in 2018.
- Six States Parties that have already declared Article 5 completion or declared no contamination under their jurisdiction or control, currently have or are suspected to have residual contamination. Algeria and Burundi declared residual contamination and destroyed mines found within the year and are therefore in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. Djibouti, Kuwait, Moldova, and Namibia are all suspected of having contamination but have not made formal declarations.
- In 2018, new use of antipersonnel mines was reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen.
- Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by ICBL-CMC as more 100km²) is believed to exist in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. One state not party, Azerbaijan, and one other area, Western Sahara, are also believed to have extensive contamination.

At least 140km² of land was reported clear of landmines in 2018, a decrease from the estimated 195km² cleared in 2017.

- Over the past five years (2014–2018), total clearance of landmines among States Parties is estimated to be about 800km², with at least 661,491 landmines destroyed.
- The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2018 was achieved in Croatia, followed by Cambodia and Afghanistan, which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance. Over the last five years, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq have cleared more than 83% of all land cleared by States Parties combined.
- In 2018, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity.
- In the last five years, States Parties have used non-technical and technical survey to release significant amounts of land, thus greatly decreasing their estimate of remaining contamination. Angola and Croatia have both released as much as 90% of previously suspected land. Cambodia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zimbabwe have also used survey effectively to release suspected hazardous areas.

Thirty States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.

- Over the past five years (2014–2018), five States Parties have declared themselves mine-free: Algeria in 2017; Burundi in 2014; Mauritania in 2017; Montenegro in 2014; and Mozambique in 2017. No state was declared free of antipersonnel mine contamination in 2018.
- As of October 2019, 28 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations, before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines after 2025: Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028).
- Yemen (current deadline 2023) and BiH (current deadline March 2021) have both requested interim extensions to enable them to better define their remaining contamination. It is expected that both will submit further extension requests in March 2022 and March 2020 respectively.
- Six countries requested extensions to their Article 5 obligations in 2019: Argentina, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.
- Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 1 February 2020, but has yet to submit an extension request, and has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014.
- Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Peru are likely to meet their Article 5 deadline obligations. It is also feasible that Chile, Ecuador, Jordan, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, and the United Kingdom (UK) can complete clearance before 2025.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2018–2019, despite ongoing efforts, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims lacked suitable resources and practices to fulfill the commitments they have made in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to 33 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims. The needs for assisting victims remain great, including in the newest States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka.

- In most States Parties, some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken.
- Nevertheless, following reductions in resources in recent years, many countries saw near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/ERW victims. Survivor networks also struggled to maintain their operations as they faced decreased resources.
- Services remained largely centralized, preventing many mine/ERW survivors who live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. Shortages of raw materials and financial resources were an obstacle to improvements in the physical rehabilitation sector in several countries.
- Only 14 of the 33 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance.
- Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, and survivors' representatives participated in 18 of the coordinating processes among those 21 States Parties. State initiatives for capacity-building toward increased participation of mine victims were almost never reported.
- Significant gaps remain in access to employment, training, and other income-generation support activities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for livelihoods were most needed.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 1.4 million destroyed in 2018.

- Oman completed the destruction of its landmine stockpile in September 2018.
- Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the convention as both have missed successive deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.
- Three States Parties possess more than four million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.5 million), Greece (643,267), and Sri Lanka (77,865).

In 1999, all states collectively (both treaty signatories and non-signatories) stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the global total of stockpiled antipersonnel mines could be less than 50 million.

PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER

Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.

- The Monitor lists 11 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow future production: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. This list remains unchanged from the previous report.
- Those most likely to be actively producing during the past year are India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
- NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen in the reporting period.
- In 2018 and early 2019, Houthi forces in Yemen were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).

Landmine Monitor has not found evidence of state to state transfers of antipersonnel mines over the past 20 years. At least nine states not party to the ban have formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US.

UNGA RESOLUTION VOTING

The pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 73/61 was adopted in December 2018 by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, and 16 abstentions.

- This is a slight increase in votes in favor from the 2017 resolution (167) and maintains the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.

A core of only 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.



A deminer busy at work at a HI demining operation in Chad. Demining is done by corridors
© HI, 2019

BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

Over the past 20 years, the Mine Ban Treaty has developed into an international norm with impressive universality. A total of 164 States Parties are implementing the treaty's provisions, which prohibit antipersonnel landmines use, production, trade, or stockpiling and require victim assistance, clearance of mined areas within 10 years, and destruction of stockpiled mines within four years. Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty abide nonetheless by its key provisions. The stigma against antipersonnel landmines remains strong.

During this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in only one country, Myanmar, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines, particularly improvised mines, with a frequency and scale in recent years that is resulting in a palpable increase in new mine casualties and threatening progress toward the long-held goal of a landmine-free world.¹ NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during this reporting period, including in States Parties Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen, and states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

In general, States Parties' implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine clearance and victim assistance, as detailed in the relevant chapters of this report, or within the online country profiles.

¹ The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as "a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons." Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term "improvised landmine" to refer to victim-activated IEDs.

Like-minded governments, United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continue to work together with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to address Mine Ban Treaty compliance challenges in a cooperative manner. The unity demonstrated by this community over the past two decades remains strong and focused on the treaty's ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES

There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2018 through October 2019. However, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in state not party Myanmar. Previously, *Landmine Monitor 2018* found that government forces in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines, and *Landmine Monitor 2017* found that government forces in states not party Myanmar and Syria used antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in six countries in the reporting period, as listed in the table.

Locations of antipersonnel mine use mid-2018–October 2019²

Use by state(s)	Use by NSAGs
Myanmar	Afghanistan Nigeria India Pakistan Myanmar Yemen

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during this reporting period, any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government or Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs likely continued to use improvised landmines to defend their positions against attack as in previous years, but access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.

Landmine Monitor was also unable to document or confirm allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Colombia, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Somalia, or Tunisia. However, in many cases, a lack of available information, or means to verify it, meant that it was not possible to determine if mine incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines, due to legacy contamination of mines laid in previous years, or involved some other kind of explosive device.³

² NSAGs used mines in at least eight countries in 2017–2018, nine countries in 2016–2017, 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.

³ New use resulting in casualties is confirmed to have occurred in 2017 earlier than October in Iraq and Syria, and was suspected earlier than October 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in *Landmine Monitor 2017*. These findings are listed in *Landmine Monitor 2017*.

LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has every year documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, known as Tatmadaw, and by various NSAGs in Myanmar.

At the treaty's Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018, the Myanmar government representative claimed that allegations that it had used landmines on the border with Bangladesh were without merit, and that joint patrols with Bangladeshi border patrols encountered no mines.⁴

However, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence stated to Landmine Monitor that "since the start of the civilian era, the Tatmadaw no longer use landmines" but qualified that by stating that in some instances landmines are still used. Specifically, he said,

"In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp."⁵

Previously, in September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defence Major General Myint Nwe informed the Myanmar parliament that the army continues to use landmines in the internal armed conflict.⁶

Since mid-2018, fighting between the Tatmadaw and NSAG the Arakan Army in Rakhine state has intensified. The Arakan Army has regularly published photographs online of antipersonnel mines produced by the Ka Pa Sa, the state-owned military industries, including MM2, MM5, and MM6 antipersonnel mines among other seized weaponry.⁷ While these photographs do not specifically identify new landmine use, they do indicate that antipersonnel mines are part of the weaponry of frontline units.

New landmine casualties in areas of conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army not previously known to have landmine contamination also indicate new use, by either the Arakan Army, the Tatmadaw, or both. In January 2018, Indian authorities blamed landmine casualties occurring on its border with Myanmar, in Mizoram state, on either the Tatmadaw or the Arakan Army, both of whom were operating in the area.⁸

Other claims of new mine use by government forces during the reporting period include:

- In September 2018, Tatmadaw forces allegedly emplaced antipersonnel mines near the villages of Zi Kahtawng and Hka La around Nam San Yang District of Waingmaw township and banned people from going to and from the villages.⁹

4 Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2018, <http://bit.ly/MyanmarMSP2018>. "[T]he security forces of Myanmar and Bangladesh have been conducting coordinated patrol along the border in the west of Myanmar. Coordinated patrol has been made for 19 times so far since August of this year. No incidents of landmines casualty have been reported in the area. Such accusation without concrete evidence will not help facilitate countries to join the convention."

5 Landmine Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, Ministry of Defence, in Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.

6 "Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries," *Global New Light of Myanmar*, 13 September 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-09-13-red.pdf. The deputy minister stated that the Tatmadaw used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, and power towers, and its outposts in military operations. The deputy minister also stated that landmines were removed when the military abandoned outposts, or warning signs were placed where landmines were planted and soldiers were not present.

7 See, Mine Free Myanmar, "Allegedly Seized Mines Displayed by Arakan Army," 18 April 2019, <https://burmamineban.demilitarization.net/?p=906>.

8 "Man hurt in Mizoram IED blast," *The Telegraph*, 18 January 2018, <http://bit.ly/2MShazs>.

9 "FBR: Clash Summary: Chaos Reigned in Northern Shan State in September," Free Burma Rangers, 15 October 2018.

- In August 2018, in Muse District, northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw allegedly warned the population of Kawng Sahti that they had laid mines around Dung Aw and Uraw Hkyet.¹⁰
- In July 2018, in Waingmaw township of Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) alleged that the Tatmadaw was emplacing antipersonnel mines along the Nam Sang River and antivehicle mines on the Zi Kahtawng road.¹¹

Frequently it is difficult to ascribe specific responsibility for an incident to a particular combatant group. In August 2019, in northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance—the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in Kutkai township. Subsequently, a Maw Harn villager was injured by a landmine. The villagers said there had been no landmines in the area prior to the conflict, but do not know whether government forces, NSAGs, or both, were responsible.¹² In September 2019, near Nama Dar village in Paletwa township of Chin state, two villagers were injured by a landmine following armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army at that spot. The villagers were unsure which entity laid the mine.¹³

In June 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reported, following their investigations into mine use allegations in September 2017, that it had

“reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, both in the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the ‘clearance operations’ with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that new antipersonnel mines were placed in border areas as part of a deliberate and planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from attempting to return to Myanmar.”¹⁴

In June 2018, the 20th Battalion of the KIA shared photographs with Landmine Monitor that it said showed mines that its forces cleared from the villages of Gauri Bum, Man Htu Bum, and Uloi Bai in Danai township. The photographs show around 80 antipersonnel mines, all M14 and MM2 types, with markings indicating Myanmar manufacture. The KIA alleged that Tatmadaw forces laid these mines in April and May, when the government forces left villages after occupying them. The KIA stated that two of their soldiers were injured while clearing the mines.¹⁵

Landmine Monitor subsequently showed the photographs to an official at the Myanmar Ministry of Defence in June 2018 and requested comment. The official noted that one mine shown in a photograph was an antivehicle mine and said that government forces do not use antivehicle mines against the insurgents as the NSAGs do not use vehicles. He said that the antipersonnel mines could be copies of Myanmar-made mines that a NSAG planted, as he said the Myanmar army does not leave landmines behind after an operation.¹⁶

10 “FBR: Clash Summary: Battles Continue in Northern Shan State Throughout August,” Free Burma Rangers, 12 September 2018.

11 “FBR: Burma Army Tortures and Kills Six Female Medics, Continues Campaign Against Civilians,” Free Burma Rangers, 26 July 2018.

12 “Kutkai Villager ‘Seriously Injured’ by Landmine,” *Burma News International*, 20 September 2019, www.bnionline.net/en/news/kutkai-villager-seriously-injured-landmine.

13 Thein Zaw, “Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa,” *Narinjara News*, 9 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/NN992019>.

14 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf.

15 Thein Zaw, “Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa,” *Narinjara News*, 9 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/NN992019>.

16 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf.

LANDMINE USE BY NSAGS

In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen.

Afghanistan

NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2018 and 2019 resulted in numerous casualties.¹⁷ The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and Islamic State forces. According to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “anti-government” forces used victim-activated improvised mines in slightly decreasing numbers throughout 2018 and the first half of 2019.¹⁸

India

Maoist insurgents have made sporadic use of improvised landmines. In April 2019, an indigenous person was reportedly killed by an improvised pressure mine, allegedly laid by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M).¹⁹ In January 2018, a wild elephant was injured by a landmine in the Latehar district, Jharkhand state, allegedly laid by the CPI-M.²⁰ Previously, in July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhatisgarh state told the state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”²¹

Myanmar

Many NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2018 and early 2019, there were reports of new use by the KIA, Arakan Army, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).²² Frequently it is difficult to ascribe specific responsibility for an incident to a particular combatant group. For example, in August 2019, in northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in Kutkai township. Subsequently a resident of Maw Harn village was injured by a landmine. The villagers said there had been no landmines in the area prior to the conflict, but do not know which group was responsible.²³

In February and March 2019, in Manli village in Namtu township of Shan state, several villagers were killed and injured by mines when returning to their agricultural fields after fighting between the Shan State Army-South and an alliance of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Shan State Army-North.²⁴ In April 2019, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services accused the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Shan State

¹⁷ In June 2018, Afghanistan stated that that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were responsible for killing approximately 171 civilians every month. Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AfgISM18.

¹⁸ UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018,” Kabul, February 2019, p. 24, <http://bit.ly/2BMQedT>; UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2017,” Kabul, February 2017, p. 31, bit.ly/AfgUNAMA2017; and UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict mid-year report 2018,” Kabul, July 2018, p. 5, <http://bit.ly/2pgvWqA>.

¹⁹ “One civilian killed in landmine blast,” *Hans News Service*, 1 April 2019, <http://bit.ly/THNI517256>.

²⁰ “Hurt tusker hints at rebels,” *The Telegraph*, 15 January 2018, <http://bit.ly/2pXzg9W>.

²¹ Tikeshwar Patel, “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: police,” *Press Trust of India*, 24 July 2017, <http://bit.ly/2WfK8vY>.

²² There are also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA) and the Restoration Council Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA) in their operations against Myanmar armed forces during the reporting period.

²³ “Kutkai Villager ‘Seriously Injured’ by Landmine,” *Burma News International*, 20 September 2019, www.bnionline.net/en/news/kutkai-villager-seriously-injured-landmine.

²⁴ Myat Moe Thu, “Three killed, four injured by landmine in Shan State,” *Myanmar Times*, 1 April 2019, www.mmtimes.com/news/three-killed-four-injured-landmine-shan-state.html.

Progressive Party (SSPP) of laying the mines that caused the injuries.²⁵ In September 2019, near Nama Dar village in Paletwa township of Chin state, two villagers were injured by a landmine following fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army. The villagers were unsure which group laid the mine.²⁶ In February 2019, near Nam Maw Lon village, in Hsipaw township, in northern Shan state, a villager died and two were injured after stepping on a mine in an area that had seen recent fighting between the Restoration Council Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA) and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA). Both groups blamed the other side for the incident.²⁷

Most allegations of new use were reported in Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states:

- In July 2019, in Hpapun township of Kayin state, the KNDO laid mines in the Bu Ah Der village tract reportedly to defend against attack by Tatmadaw.²⁸
- In May 2019, in Hlaingbwe township of Kayin state, a DKBA officer from Meh Pru village tract ordered his soldiers to plant more landmines in seven nearby mountainous villages to protect the area.²⁹
- In December 2018, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization of southern Shan state stated that the Restoration Council Shan State/Shan State Army-South had frequently laid landmines in their area.³⁰
- In August–September 2018, in Hpapun township of Kayin state, KNLA Battalion #102, Company #4 informed villagers that they would lay mines near former Tatmadaw military camps, and that they should not go to those areas. Subsequently two Tatmadaw soldiers reportedly were injured by these mines.³¹
- In November 2018, two civilians were injured in a mine incident which the KIA blamed on use by the TNLA.³²
- In October 2018, New Mon State Party claimed that the KNU had laid landmines in a disputed area in Yebyu township in Thanintharyi region.³³ The KNU denied the allegation.³⁴
- In August 2018, near Kammamaung in Hlaingbwe township of Kayin state a KNLA soldier was injured by a mine he had laid.³⁵

Nigeria

In Nigeria, the NSAG Boko Haram has used improvised landmines since mid-2014.³⁶ In June 2019, Nigeria reported new contamination in the northeastern part of the country.³⁷ Previously

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- 25 Min Naing Soe, "Army announces TNLA and SSPP planned mine attack in Manli Village," *Eleven Myanmar*, 1 April 2019, <http://bit.ly/2WgbbY6>.
- 26 Thein Zaw, "Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa," *Narinjara News*, 9 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/NN992019>.
- 27 "One Killed, Two Injured in Hsipaw Landmine Blast," *Burma News International*, 20 February 2019, www.bnionline.net/en/news/one-killed-two-injured-hsipaw-landmine-blast.
- 28 Karen Human Rights Group, "KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor," September 2019, unpublished.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Nyein Nyein, "Shan Armed Group Kills At Least Four Ethnic Pa-O in Shooting," *the Irrawaddy*, 12 December 2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/shan-armed-group-kills-least-four-ethnic-pa-o-shooting.html.
- 31 Karen Human Rights Group, "KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor," September 2019, unpublished.
- 32 "FBR: Clash Summary: Steady Fighting in November in Northern Burma," *Free Burma Rangers*, 15 December 2018.
- 33 "Landmine blasts injure two in NMSP-KNU disputed-area in Yebyu Tsp within this month," *Burma News International*, 29 October 2018, <http://bit.ly/349sMnt>.
- 34 "Three More Landmines Explode in Tanintharyi," *Burma News International*, 9 January 2019, www.bnionline.net/en/news/three-more-landmines-explode-tanintharyi.
- 35 "Skirmishes Between Burma Army and KNLA Increase in Northern Karen State," *Karen News*, 18 September 2018, <http://bit.ly/31PMEKH>.
- 36 See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Nigeria: Mine Ban Policy," 2015–2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2019/nigeria/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
- 37 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Stockpile Destruction, 22 May 2019, <http://bit.ly/346kJaK>.

in September 2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) issued a report detailing significant new use of improvised antipersonnel landmines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups on roads, in fields, and in villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Yobe and Adamawa states.³⁸

In June 2019, the Nigerian Army published photographs of two pressure plate activated explosive devices encountered during counter insurgency activities in Borno state.³⁹ Previously, on 6 March 2018, four loggers were killed when they stepped on landmines reportedly laid by Boko Haram near Dikwa, 90 kilometers east of Maiduguri in Borno state, after they went to retrieve a vehicle abandoned the previous day during a Boko Haram attack.⁴⁰ In early 2017, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported extensive use of improvised mines by Boko Haram in northern areas of Nigeria.⁴¹

Pakistan

NSAGs in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used improvised antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period. Use is attributed to a variety of militant groups, frequently referred to as “miscreants” in media reports, but generally accepted to be constituent groups of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups.⁴² As in previous years, many military personnel and some civilians were killed or injured in incidents of new use, however from available information it is difficult to make specific attribution to the perpetrators. The Monitor has recorded numerous antipersonnel mine incidents in Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although in some cases the precise date of mine use cannot be ascertained.

Yemen

Houthi forces in Yemen used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during 2018 and 2019, primarily on the west coast of the country near the port of Hodeida. Houthi forces are also reported to have used landmines in the past along the coast, along the border with Saudi Arabia, around key towns, along roads, and to cover retreats.

A Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen convened by the UN Human Rights Council reported in September 2019, “The use of landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, by the Houthis has resulted in significant harm to civilians.” According to the report, the group

“investigated reports of civilian casualties caused by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines allegedly emplaced by Houthi fighters in Aden, Al Hudaydah, Lahij and Ta’izz governorates, and examined further reports of civilian casualties from landmines in Abyan, al-Dhale’e, Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Ibb, Ma’rib, Sana’a, Sa’dah and Shabwah governorates. It confirmed civilian casualties from anti-personnel landmines verified as having been emplaced by Houthi fighters in incidents it investigated in Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Lahij and Ta’izz governorates.”⁴³

³⁸ MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/MAGNigeria2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of victims of explosive incidents were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and early 2018.

³⁹ It is uncertain from available information if this device can be triggered by a person. Nigerian Army, “Troops thwart terrorist ambush,” Press Release, 23 June 2019, <http://bit.ly/369HZql>.

⁴⁰ “Boko Haram terror continues, 10 killed in fresh attacks,” *Telangana Today (AFP)*, 7 March 2018, <https://telanganatoday.com/boko-haram-kills-nigerian-attacks>.

⁴¹ UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria, 3 to 14 April 2017,” p. 2.

⁴² Email from Raza Shah Khan, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), 30 September 2019, and 21 September 2017. See also, “Landmine blasts kill five in Pakistan’s tribal areas,” *Arab News* (Pakistan), 21 August 2019, www.arabnews.pk/node/1543081/pakistan; “Soldier martyred, 5 injured in North Waziristan landmine blast,” *Tribal New Network*, 25 August 2019, www.tnn.com.pk/soldier-martyred-5-injured-in-north-waziristan-landmine-blast/; “At least 2 FC personnel killed, 5 injured in Kurram Agency blast,” *The Nation*, 10 July 2017, <http://bit.ly/32RwQsf>; and Ajmal Wesai, “4 children wounded in Tirinkot bomb explosion,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 5 August 2017, www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/08/05/4-children-wounded-tirinkot-bomb-explosion.

⁴³ “Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014: Report of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts as submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” A/HRC/42/17, 9 August 2019, para. 45, <http://bit.ly/2JpVUPg>.

In April 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that Houthi-planted landmines had killed at least 140 civilians since 2018.⁴⁴ In November 2018, employees at the Hodeidah port accused Houthi forces of placing landmines in the area around the port's entrances.⁴⁵ Previously, the Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that Houthi forces laid more than 300,000 landmines between 2016 and 2018.⁴⁶ International media reported that mine clearance teams funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cleared and destroyed hundreds of Houthi-laid mines in 2018.⁴⁷

There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in Yemen.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the Treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.⁴⁸

No states joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period.

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.

ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

Since 1997, an annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the Treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.⁴⁹

On 5 December 2018, UNGA Resolution 73/61 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, and 16 abstentions.⁵⁰ This is a slight increase in votes in favor from the 2017 resolution (167) and maintains the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the United States (US), and Vietnam.⁵¹

44 "Yemen: Houthi Landmines Kill Civilians, Block Aid," Human Rights Watch, 22 April 2019, www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/22/yemen-houthi-landmines-kill-civilians-block-aid.

45 "Houthis mine Hodeidah port entrances as pro-government offensive pauses," *Middle East Eye*, 14 November 2018, <http://bit.ly/2qQhndX>.

46 Conflict Armament Research, "Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen's West Coast," September 2018, p. 4, <http://bit.ly/32PfuMp>.

47 See for example, @LostWeapons, "another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in yemen. TM62 anti tank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs," 12 October 2018, Tweet, <https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/status/1050646259185242112/photo/1>; and @BrowneGareth, "UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS," 17 July 2018, Tweet, <https://twitter.com/BrowneGareth/status/1019296299391373312/photo/1>.

48 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of "succession." These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

49 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

50 The 16 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, and Vietnam.

51 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. None have done so during the reporting period. At least 70 NSAGs committed to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997.⁵² The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

In November 2016, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the Colombian government signed an agreement to end the armed conflict. This halted the FARC's widespread improvised landmine use and resulted in the surrender and destruction of its stockpiled mines and components. In August 2019, however, a small contingent of rebel, former FARC, leaders announced that they were entering a "new stage of armed struggle."⁵³ It is not yet clear whether that group will continue use of improvised antipersonnel mines. Previously, in October 2017, a ceasefire was agreed between the government of Colombia under which the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) committed not to use antipersonnel landmines that could endanger the civilian population.⁵⁴ However, the ceasefire ended in January 2018, and as of October 2019 had not been renewed.⁵⁵

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.⁵⁶ Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.⁵⁷

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so.⁵⁸

Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

⁵² As of October 2019, 46 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 20 by self-declaration, four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment), and two through a Peace Accord (Nepal, Colombia). See, Geneva Call, "Deed of Commitment," undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/.

⁵³ Megan Janetsky, "Ex-FARC leaders' return to arms brings back memories of bloodshed," *Al Jazeera*, 30 August 2019, <http://bit.ly/32QcwYh>.

⁵⁴ See, "Acuerdo y comunicado sobre el cese al fuego bilateral y temporal entre el Gobierno y el ELN (Agreement and communiqué on the bilateral and temporary ceasefire between the Government and the ELN)," Oficina del alto comisionado para la paz, Quito, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/AcuerdoELN2017.

⁵⁵ Adriaan Alsima, "Colombia's ELN rebels blame government for failure to agree to ceasefire," *Colombia Reports*, 2 July 2018, <http://bit.ly/31PzjSv>.

⁵⁶ There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

⁵⁷ Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.

⁵⁸ For example, Singapore's only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, ST Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it "is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines." Local Authority Pension Fund, "ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions," 18 November 2015, <http://bit.ly/2p5nz17>. However, Singapore is still listed as a producer as it has not formally committed to not produce landmines in the future.

In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel landmines in the previous five years.⁵⁹ Until its renounces future production, South Korea remains listed as a producer of antipersonnel mines.

Production of antipersonnel mines by India continued in 2018 and orders indicate that production extended into 2019. Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government transaction database list private companies providing component parts for APER-1B antipersonnel mines to the Indian Ordnance Factories, a state-owned enterprise, into June 2019.⁶⁰ Previously, in September 2018, Indian military officials told the Monitor that the final assembly of complete mine remains under the exclusive control of Indian Ordnance Factories.⁶¹ In the previous two years, components were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition Factory Khadki in Maharashtra state.⁶²

NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen.⁶³ In September 2018, the arms consultancy Conflict Armament Research reported that Houthi forces were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised antipersonnel landmines). It found that this includes the standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared sensors.⁶⁴

Previously, in January 2017, MAG reported that Islamic State in Syria and Iraq produced near-factory quality improvised landmines on a large scale.⁶⁵

TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: landmine producers China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, plus Israel, Kazakhstan, and the US. Other past exporters have made

⁵⁹ Email to the ICBL, from Soonhee Choi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea, 22 August 2019.

⁶⁰ In February 2018, Supreme Industries Ltd was listed as having concluded a contract for production of material for antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders, <http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en>. However, no other orders were listed as concluded between December 2017 and September 2018 for antipersonnel mines. Components and materials for directional mines and antivehicle mines were listed.

⁶¹ Landmine Monitor meeting with Cdre. Nishant Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Sumit Kabthiyal, Ministry of Defense, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 27 August 2018.

⁶² The following companies were listed as having concluded contracts listed for production of components of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition, the following companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. Mine types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines, <http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en>. Indian Ordnance Factories website, http://ofb.gov.in/vendor/general_reports/show/registered_vendors/820.

⁶³ Previous lists of NSAGs producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq, Syria, and Thailand. However, with the loss of territory by Islamic State, it was not possible to confirm that this activity continued in the reporting period.

⁶⁴ Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” September 2018, <http://bit.ly/32PfuMp>.

⁶⁵ MAG Issue Brief, “Landmine Emergency: Twenty years on from the Ottawa Treaty the world is facing a new humanitarian crisis,” January 2017.

statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.⁶⁶

Types of antipersonnel mines previously stockpiled by Yemen and types used after 2013

Antipersonnel mines originally stockpiled	Antipersonnel mines used after 2013
PP-Mi-SR	GLD-150A (Claymore-type produced by China)
PMD-6	Gyata-64 (formerly produced by Hungary)
PMN-1	PMN-1 and PMN-2
POMZ-2	PPM-2 (produced by former East Germany) PSM-1 (formerly produced by Bulgaria) Hybrid PMN & PPM-2 (origin not known)

At least five types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen has reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel.

The evidence of further use of antipersonnel mines starting in 2016 suggests either that the 2002 declaration to States Parties on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by

the Houthis and the General People's Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that their government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.⁶⁷ In April 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that the Sanaa-based Ministry of Defense stockpiles antipersonnel mines.⁶⁸

STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile antipersonnel landmines.⁶⁹ In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global collective total may be less than 50 million.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

⁶⁷ Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 7 September 2016, bit.ly/YemenHRWSept2016.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 April 2017, bit.ly/YemenLetterApr2017HRW.

⁶⁹ Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.

⁷⁰ In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is "less than" five million, but there is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

It is unclear if all 30 states are currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

NON-STATE ARMED GROUP STOCKPILES

Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to obtain factory-made antipersonnel mines now that production and transfers have largely halted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs in states not party have acquired landmines by stealing them from government stocks, purchasing them from corrupt officials, or removing them from minefields. Most that use mines appear to make their own improvised landmines from locally available materials.

The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces, reports of significant use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY STATES PARTIES

At least 160 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 93 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 67 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 1.4 million destroyed in 2018.

Three States Parties possess more than a combined four million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.5 million), Greece (643,267), and Sri Lanka (77,865). It is unclear if State Party Tuvalu possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines.⁷¹ Somalia clarified in its annual transparency report that it does not possess stocks.

In November 2018, Oman announced the completion of destruction of its stockpiles ahead of its 1 February 2019 deadline.⁷² It began the destruction process on 13 September 2015

Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel mines

Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	estimated 6 million
India	estimated 4–5 million
China	“less than” 5 million
US	3 million
Total	45 million

States not party that likely have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Kazakhstan	Nepal
Azerbaijan	Korea, North	Pakistan
Bahrain	Korea, South	Russia
China	Kyrgyzstan	Saudi Arabia
Cuba	Lao PDR	Singapore
Egypt	Lebanon	Syria
Georgia	Libya	UAE
India	Mongolia	US
Iran	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Israel	Myanmar	Vietnam

⁷¹ Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which had a destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014. Tuvalu, Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, bit.ly/MBTSomalia2013Art7.

⁷² Statement of Oman, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018, <http://bit.ly/OmanMSP2018>. Oman reiterated this information in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2019.

and completed destruction on 25 September 2018. Oman destroyed 6,104 antipersonnel mines in 2018.⁷³

Sri Lanka declared a significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines in November 2018 when it submitted its initial transparency measures report. Its deadline for completion of destruction is 1 June 2029, but Sri Lanka stated its intent to complete stockpile destruction by the end of 2020.⁷⁴ Sri Lanka reported that the destruction of 57,033 antipersonnel mines had occurred prior to November 2018, for a total stockpile prior to destruction of 134,898 antipersonnel mines.

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.⁷⁵ Neither state has indicated when the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay, and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.

DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES BY NSAGS

Disarmament of the FARC in Colombia, including destruction of its antipersonnel landmine stockpile and components, occurred under UN supervision and was completed on 22 September 2017. The UN mission destroyed 3,528 antipersonnel mines formerly belonging to the FARC, as well as components, including more than 38,000kgs of explosives and more than 46,000 detonators.⁷⁶

From 2006 to 2019, Polisario Front of Western Sahara undertook eight public destruction events in order to totally destroy its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. On 6 January 2019, with an eighth and final destruction of 2,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, it destroyed the last of its stockpiled mines, which once totaled 20,493.⁷⁷

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH (ARTICLE 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 69 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 33 retain more than 1,000 mines and three (Sri Lanka, Finland, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-six States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 37 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.⁷⁸

⁷³ Oman, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), submitted April 2019, states that in 2018 Oman destroyed 502 No. 7 dingbat mines; 4,624 M409 mines; and 978 DM 31 mines, <http://bit.ly/OmanArt72019>.

⁷⁴ Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, November 2018, <http://bit.ly/SriLankaArt72018>.

⁷⁵ Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.

⁷⁶ “Misión de la ONU concluyó hoy la inhabilitación de armas de las Farc,” *Radio Nacional de Colombia*, 22 September 2017, <http://bit.ly/2BNpjia>.

⁷⁷ Geneva Call, “Final destruction of 2,485 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Western Sahara,” Press Release, 22 January 2019, <http://bit.ly/2Nk2YhH>.

⁷⁸ In 2018, Cambodia, Argentina, and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpile retained for training and research, and the UK announced that their stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under the scope of the convention. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial transparency report, which was originally due in 2012.

States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

State	Last declared total (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2018	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Sri Lanka	21,153 (2018)	21,153	0	N/A	-
Finland	16,192 (2017)	16,500	0	2017	-
Bangladesh	12,050 (2016)	15,000	0	2013	-
Turkey	9,259 (2018)	16,000	56	2018	5,159
Sweden	6,009 (2018)	13,948	5	2018	-
Greece	5,599 (2018)	7,224	28	2018	-
Croatia	4,973 (2018)	17,500	⁷⁹ 3	2018	-
Venezuela	4,875 (2011)	4,960	N/R	2010	-
Belarus	4,505 (2018)	7,530	0	2017	1,484
Tunisia	4,405 (2018)	5,000	55	2018	-
France	3,941 (2018)	4,539	0	2016	-
Yemen	3,760 (2016)	4,000	0	2008	-
Nigeria	3,364 (2011)	3,364	N/R	None ever	-
Bulgaria	3,318 (2018)	10,466	6	2018	6,446
Serbia	3,134 (2018)	5,000	0	2017	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	N/R	Unclear	-
Indonesia	2,454 (2015)	4,978	N/R	2009	2,524
Romania	2,395 (2018)	4,000	0	2013	1,500
Czech Rep.	2,180 (2018)	4,859	26	2018	-
Belgium	2,066 (2018)	5,980	52	2018	-
Peru	2,015 (2018)	9,526	0	2012	7,487
Oman	2,000 (2017)	2,000	N/R	None ever	-
Canada	1,878 (2018)	1,781	10	2017	-
Denmark	1,783 (2015)	4,991	N/R	2013	2,900
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	N/R	2007	-
Uganda	1,764 (2011)	2,400	N/R	2003	-
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	N/R	2009	-
Spain	1,547 (2017)	10,000	N/R	2017	6,000
Angola	1,304 (2018)	1,460	0	2018	-
Chile	1,192 (2018)	28,647	1,005	2018	23,694
Slovakia	1,035 (2018)	7,000	52	2018	5,500
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	N/R	2007	-
Botswana	1,002 (2018)	1,019	17	Unclear	-
Partial total	138,582	257,996	1,315		64,664

Note: N/A = not applicable; N/R = not reported.

⁷⁹ Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2019, <http://bit.ly/2WhJ7DA>. There is a discrepancy in Croatia's reporting on its retained mines. The 2019 report lists 4,973 mines retained for training and research, a decrease of 77 from the number reported in 2018 (5,050). However, Croatia lists only three mines as consumed in 2018 in accordance with Article 3—one each of type PMA-1A, PMA-2, and PMR-2A.

In addition to those listed above, another 34 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 14,842 retained mines.⁸⁰

In May 2019, Thailand announced it had carried out a review of its retained mines and would destroy a further 3000 before the end of 2019.⁸¹ However, at an event on 6 August 2019, Thailand destroyed its entire number of retained mines of 3,133, at which Thai Armed Forces Joint Chief of Staff General Chaichana Nakkerd stated “From now on, Thailand will no longer retain any more anti-personnel landmines.”⁸²

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.⁸³

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of eight States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).

As of 1 October 2019, 49% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2018. A total of 83 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2018. Of this latter group, most have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Japan (898), Netherlands (889), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Sudan (739), Mauritania (728), Cambodia (720), Portugal (694), Italy (617), South Africa (576), Germany (465), Zimbabwe (450), Cyprus (440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Brazil (364), Congo (322), Cote d'Ivoire (290), Slovenia (272), Uruguay (260), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).

⁸¹ Statement of Thailand (written submission), Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Article 3, Geneva, 24 May 2019, <http://bit.ly/ThaiMBTIM2019>.

⁸² Thanaporn Promyanyai, “Thai army destroys thousands of landmines in jungle,” *AFP*, 6 August 2019, <https://yhoo.it/3435yzd>.


⁸³ Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and the UK.

⁸⁴ States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in *italics*: *Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep. of), Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, North Macedonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.*

Nigeria, Yemen, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use of improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination in their annually updated Article 7 reports.

Morocco, a state not party, submitted a voluntary report in 2017–2019 (as well as in 2006, 2008–2011, and 2013). In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2012 and 2013), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

1997 MINE BAN TREATY: STATUS 2018





A mine in the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

20-YEAR OVERVIEW

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

STATES PARTIES

As of September 2019, a total of 34 States Parties have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control.

States Parties with antipersonnel mine contamination as of September 2019

Afghanistan	Cyprus**	Oman	Tajikistan
Angola	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Palestine	Thailand
Argentina*	Ecuador	Peru	Turkey
Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH)	Eritrea	Senegal	Ukraine
Cambodia	Ethiopia	Serbia	United Kingdom (UK)*
Chad	Iraq	Somalia	Yemen
Chile	Jordan	South Sudan	Zimbabwe
Colombia	Niger	Sri Lanka	
Croatia	Nigeria	Sudan	

*Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them.

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

Another six States Parties that have already declared Article 5 completion or declared no contamination under their jurisdiction or control, currently have or are suspected to have residual contamination:

Algeria: Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 commitments on 10 February 2017, validated at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, in December 2017. However, it continues to find and destroy isolated mines. From December 2016 to October 2018, a total of 668

“isolated” antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed by army units designated to deal with residual contamination.¹ As Algeria declares the contamination and destroys the mines found within the year, it is compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Burundi: Burundi declared fulfilment of its Article 5 commitments on 1 April 2014, but from 2017 to 2019, it found a few (four) isolated mines which it cleared and destroyed. It maintains a national police force trained by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) for the collection and destruction of residual contamination.² As Burundi declares the contamination and destroys the mines found within the year, it is compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Djibouti: Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict, in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.³

Kuwait: There have been a number of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2017, there were four reported casualties, an increase from three in 2016.⁴ In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines in the country, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.⁵ The landmines are believed to be mainly on the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

Moldova: The Republic of Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings in Geneva, on 2 June 2008.⁶

Namibia: Namibia made a statement at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, and it has reported that it has no mined areas under its jurisdiction and control. However, it is suspected that there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.⁷

STATES NOT PARTY

In addition to the 34 States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines, there are also 26 states and other areas not party to the Mine Ban Treaty that have antipersonnel mine contamination. Lao PDR and Lebanon are party to the Convention of Cluster Munitions and have prioritized the clearance of cluster munition remnants.

¹ Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 October 2018, p. 39.

² Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 4 October 2019, p. 6.

³ See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Djibouti: Mine Action,” 17 December 2012, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/djibouti/mine-action.aspx.

⁴ ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Kuwait: Casualties,” 10 October 2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/kuwait/casualties.aspx.

⁵ “Torrential downpour unearths landmines in Kuwait,” *The National*, 21 November 2018, <http://bit.ly/2NjHzFh>.

⁶ See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Moldova: Mine Action,” 17 December 2012, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/moldova/mine-action.aspx.

⁷ ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Namibia: Mine Action,” 13 July 2011, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/namibia/mine-action.aspx.

States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination as of September 2019

Armenia	Iran	Lebanon	<i>Somaliland</i>
Azerbaijan	Israel	Libya	Syria
China	Korea, North	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Cuba	Korea, South	Myanmar	Vietnam
Egypt	<i>Kosovo</i>	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Georgia	Kyrgyzstan	Pakistan	
India	Lao PDR	Russia	

Note: Other areas are indicated by *italics*.

NEW CONTAMINATION

New use of antipersonnel mines in recent and ongoing conflicts has exacerbated the remaining challenge for some states in addressing antipersonnel mine contamination. In some cases, this includes contamination by mines of an improvised nature. In many cases, the new contamination has not yet been fully quantified.

Over the last five years (2014–2018) there was new contamination in several States Parties including Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Yemen. In 2018, new use of antipersonnel mines was reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen.

Afghanistan: Continuing conflict between the government, the Taliban, and other armed groups is still adding new contamination, particularly by improvised mines.⁸

Chad: Mine incidents were reported in Chad in August 2016⁹ and August 2017.¹⁰ In April 2018, soldiers were killed and wounded during a series of operations in the Lake Chad region against Boko Haram forces that reportedly used landmines and suicide bombs.¹¹

Colombia: The National Liberation Army (ELN) and drug-trafficking groups continue the struggle for control in about one-quarter of the country's municipalities.¹² In ELN strongholds, such as the coastal department of Chocó, it has been reported that actors are emplacing mines in order to protect their territory.¹³

Iraq: Occupation of large areas of Iraq by Islamic State after 2014 added extensive contamination to Iraq's existing legacy mined areas. Much of the new contamination comprises improvised mines and other explosive devices. Many of these devices are reported to be antipersonnel mines prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁸ See, for example, reports that armed opposition groups mined the highway linking Kabul and Ghazni during fighting in August 2018. "Intense fighting as Taliban presses to take Afghan city," *Reuters*, 12 August 2018.

⁹ "Boko Haram landmine kills four Chadian soldiers," *Reuters*, 27 August 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-chad-idUSKCN1120KY.

¹⁰ "Tchad: un véhicule d'orpailleurs saute sur une mine près de Zouar dans le Tibesti, 8 morts et 11 blessés" ("Chad: A miners' vehicle hits on a mine near Zouar in Tibesti, 8 dead and 11 wounded"), *Tchad Convergence*, 20 August 2017, <http://bit.ly/2pS2rvk>.

¹¹ "Nigeria: Boko Haram – Military Winning the Lake Chad War Despite Losses – General Irabor," *Premium Times*, 29 April 2018, <http://bit.ly/2JmZKIU>.

¹² International Crisis Group, "Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach," 21 June 2018; and Mine Action Review interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), in Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda and Sergio Mahecha, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), in Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, in San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Charles Cagua Zambrano and Francisco Profeta Cardoso, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), in Centro Poblado de Santo Domingo, 11 August 2018.

¹³ Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

Nigeria: At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared that it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.¹⁴ However, since 2017, there have been reports of numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from landmines and a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko Haram in the northeast of the country.¹⁵

Tunisia: Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the last five years. It is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.

Yemen: The ongoing conflict between the Houthi rebels in the north and the Saudi-led coalition in the south which flared in March 2015 has led to further contamination, although its full extent is unknown. Previously cleared areas, such as Aden (declared free of mines in 2003), are believed to be re-contaminated.¹⁶

Over the last five years there was unconfirmed use of antipersonnel mines in States Parties Cameroon and Mali.

Cameroon: Mine contamination has been reported in Cameroon since 2015, with incidents reported involving “roadside IEDs”.¹⁷ Cameroonian military officials also reported in 2015 that large numbers of landmines had been planted by Boko Haram along Cameroon’s Nigerian border.¹⁸

Mali: Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017, it has experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs in the center of the country.¹⁹

There was confirmed new mine use by government forces in state not party Myanmar in 2018 and the first half of 2019. Landmine Monitor did not document or confirm any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces in Syria during 2018. There was confirmed new use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar and India. It is also likely that NSAGs have continued to use improvised mines in Syria, although this was not confirmed.

EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION

Based on information provided by official sources, massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by ICBL-CMC as more than 100km²) is believed to exist in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. One state not party, Azerbaijan and one other area, Western Sahara, are also believed to have massive contamination.

However, the extent of contamination estimated in some countries may in the future be subject to significant revision—either increased or decreased—based on survey results. For example, Ethiopia, which is currently believed to be heavily contaminated, with an estimated

¹⁴ Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011. In January 2017, a civil war-era landmine was found in Ebonyi state, which villagers thought was an IED. Police forensics concluded it was a landmine left over from the conflict that ended 47 years previous, which had washed up in a river. A bomb squad destroyed the device, and according to the police, the area was searched and no evidence of other contamination was found. J. Eze, “Nigeria: Civil War Explosive Found in Ebonyi Community – Police,” *AllAfrica*, 17 January 2017, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201701180015.html>.

¹⁵ J. Payne, “Nigeria’s military believes it has Boko Haram cornered, but landmines are getting in the way,” *Reuters*, 2 May 2015, <http://bit.ly/2MQLGK0>; and “Nigeria: Landmine Blast Kills Soldier, Three Vigilantes in Sambisa Forest,” *AllAfrica*, 24 April 2015, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201504240329.html>.

¹⁶ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9.

¹⁷ UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS explosive hazard mitigation response in Cameroon, 9 January–13 April 2017,” 30 April 2017, p. 11; and email from Camille Aubourg, UNMAS, 17 September 2018.

¹⁸ M.E. Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram,” *Voice of America News*, 3 March 2015; and M.E. Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens with Land Mines,” *Voice of America News*, 24 May 2015.

¹⁹ UNMAS, “Programmes: Mali,” 31 August 2019, www.unmas.org/en/programmes/mali.

Estimated extent of mine contamination in States Parties, September 2019

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia, and the Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Massive (>100km²)				
Angola Chad		Afghanistan Cambodia Thailand	BiH Croatia Turkey	Iraq Yemen
Heavy (20–99km²)				
Eritrea Ethiopia Somalia South Sudan Zimbabwe	Colombia	Sri Lanka		
Medium (5–19km²)				
Sudan	Argentina* Chile		Tajikistan UK*	
Light (<5km²)				
DRC Niger Senegal	Ecuador Peru		Cyprus** Serbia	Jordan Palestine
Extent of contamination not defined				
Nigeria			Ukraine	Oman

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

total of 1,056km² of contaminated land, has also reported that it expects only about 2% of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to contain mines.²⁰ Ukraine currently estimates around 7,000km² of contaminated land,²¹ but this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq have all suffered recent contamination due to conflict and are required to reassess the scope and nature of their contamination. Ongoing conflict, insecurity and a lack of access to certain areas hamper these efforts.²² Thailand, Cambodia,

²⁰ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 10 and 35. However, Ethiopia has reported different estimates of the percentage of SHAs expected to be confirmed, between 0.5% and 3%. See the Revised National Mine Action Plan for 2017–2020, October 2017, pp. 1–3, & 9; statement of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 42.

²¹ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 1.

²² Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, August 2012, p. 23; Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9; and Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, pp. 10–12, & 88.

and Turkey still have to verify the extent of contamination along border areas where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation, insecurity, or territorial disputes.²³ Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its control in Northern Cyprus, although its most recent extension request in 2013 does not include a timeline for clearance of mines there.

Some states have continued to improve their understanding of the extent of contamination using land release methodologies to cancel suspected areas by non-technical survey and to reduce confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) through technical survey. Angola, Croatia, Cambodia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zimbabwe have all been able to reduce previous estimates of contaminated land through the implementation of survey.²⁴

Several states not party for which no estimate of contamination is provided are believed to be massively contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data is available on the extent of contamination.²⁵ Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have widespread contamination, but the extent is not known.

LANDMINE CLEARANCE

Among States Parties, total clearance of landmines in 2018 was at least 140km².²⁶ This represents a decrease from the estimated 195km² cleared in 2017. Over the five-year period from 2014–2018, total clearance of landmines among States Parties is estimated to be almost 800km², with at least 661,491 landmines destroyed.

However, these figures should be taken with caution due to the problems with obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated mine clearance figures from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual reports.

The figures may also underestimate the true amount cleared as clearance by some actors, such as armed forces, police, or commercial operators, may not be systematically reported. In some states, informal clearance or community-based clearance has been conducted, which is not subject to quality management and entry into the national databases. In some cases, land was cleared that was found to contain no mines. For further details of land release results for the period 2014–2018 and 20-year totals where available, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website.²⁷

Based on the available data, Croatia has cleared the most land in the last five years at 195km², followed by Cambodia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity. In Iraq, IED clearance has not been consistently included in clearance figures as it was not known how much of the contamination was by improvised mines. Reported figures for clearance in 2017 were high at over 85km², of which 55km² was areas affected by IEDs. However, the device type was

23 Improved relationships between Thailand and Cambodia have led to cooperation to survey and clear border areas. See, “CMAC, Thai join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” *The Phnom Penh Post*, 24 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/2pRUu9t>.

24 Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 August 2017, p. 5; CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,” p. 9; and Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, p. 7.

25 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-Hoon, “Find One Million: War with Landmines,” *Korea Times*, 3 June 2010.

26 This refers to land cleared and does not include land released or canceled through survey.

27 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

not specified and large areas were reported as cleared but with no devices destroyed.²⁸ The amount of land reported cleared in Iraq in 2018 is low compared to 2017 figures, although over 14km² was released through survey. Yemen was able to clear 0.64km² as part of its emergency response in four governates from 2016–2018. It also destroyed over 14,000 antipersonnel landmines in the five years from 2014.²⁹

Ecuador, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, and Ukraine have all cleared well under 1km² in the last five years. Ecuador's clearance output dropped in 2016 due to an earthquake in April of that year that diverted the armed forces away from demining.³⁰ For Palestine, clearance in the West Bank is constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations, although HALO Trust is currently conducting clearance in the West Bank.³¹ Serbia has reported lack of funding, climatic conditions, unrecorded mined areas, and groups of mines laid haphazardly complicated clearance and survey efforts.³² The extent of contamination in Ukraine is currently unknown and survey and clearance by international operators only began in 2015. Ukraine is currently establishing a mine action program.

Several countries have failed to report figures for mine clearance on a regular basis. Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Niger have not reported consistently on clearance since 2014.

In some countries, a decrease in clearance output has been matched by an increase in the amount of land released through survey. In Croatia, there was a 20% decrease in area cleared in 2017, although the amount of land released through survey was doubled.

No mine clearance was reported in the last five years in Cyprus or Argentina. Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.³³ Argentina reports that it is mine-affected as a result of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, but that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the islands due to the "illegal occupation" by the UK.³⁴

In Algeria, which declared completion of clearance in 2016, no areas were reported as cleared, but 668 isolated mines have been destroyed between December 2016 and October 2018.³⁵

Clearance of mined areas 2014–2018 (km²)

State Party	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total cleared	APMs destroyed
Afghanistan	22.28	13.44	27.12	28.12	30.04	121	57,051
Angola	2.2	4.1	1.2	1.2	1.04	9.74	N/R
Argentina	<i>See clearance figures under UK</i>						
BiH	1.85	1.64	1.34	0.69	0.92	6.44	8,718
Cambodia	54.38	46.47	25.33	27.68	36.66	190.52	43,384
Chad	N/R	N/R	0.58	N/R	N/R	0.58	N/R
Chile	2.14	1.89	3.52	0.86	0.65	9.06	4,000

²⁸ See ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Iraq: Mine Action," 16 November 2018, <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/iraq/mine-action.aspx>.

²⁹ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, pp. 14–15; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form J, p. 25.

³⁰ Ecuador, Article 5 Implementation Update, June 2017.

³¹ HALO Trust, "West Bank," undated, www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/middle-east/west-bank/.

³² Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2018, p. 7.

³³ Cyprus, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.

³⁴ Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 April 2010.

³⁵ Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 October 2018, p. 39.

State Party	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total cleared	APMs destroyed
Colombia	0.54	0.36	0.29	0.38	0.84	2.41	1,014
Croatia	37.7	40.6	38.2	29.88	48.82	195.2	7,858
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DRC	0.33	0.49	0.37	0.44	0.27	³⁶ 1.9	5
Ecuador	0.039	0.066	0.0001	0.0154	0.014	0.134	6,219
Eritrea	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R		N/R
Ethiopia	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	1.4937	582
Iraq	17.08	25.19	27.36	85.24	4.03	158.9	60,128
Jordan	0.55	0.65	1.36	1.44	0.96	4.96	420
Niger	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	³⁸ 0.039	1,075
Palestine	0.021	0.063	0.034	0.041	³⁹ 0.026	0.185	626
Peru	0.0084	0.076	0.018	0.009	0.015	0.126	3,797
Senegal	N/R	0.91	0.14	0.1	0	1.15	25
Serbia	0.27	0.41	0	0	0.21	0.89	46
Somalia	4.6	0	1.2	0.76	N/R	6.56	53
S. Sudan	8.19	9.46	10.53	9.85	8.53	46.56	5,080
Sri Lanka	2.66	3.58	2.8	3.25	N/R	12.29	150,384
Sudan	2.47	0.42	1.04	0.71	0.97	5.61	479
Tajikistan	0.65	0.25	0.5	0.62	0.59	2.61	14,395
Thailand	0.22	2.04	0.39	0.42	0.52	3.59	19,967
Turkey	0.15	0	0.12	0.82	2.08	3.17	169,882
Ukraine	0	0	0	0.22	0	⁴⁰ 0.22	5
UK	0	0.59	0.94	1.05	0.57	⁴¹ 43.15	4,173
Yemen	0.34	0	3.07	0	0.64	⁴² 4.05	14,031
Zimbabwe	0.49	0.71	1.67	1.66	2.11	6.64	83,254
Total	159.16	153.41	149.12	195.46	140.51	799.17	661,491

Note: APMs = antipersonnel mines; N/R = not reported.

³⁶ 2014–2017 figures reported in DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 2017, p. 10. Figures reported by ICBL-CMC for 2014–2017 are lower (2014: 0.22km²; 2015: 0.31km²; 2016: 0.37km²; 2017: 0.44km²).

³⁷ Mine clearance figure for period 2016–2018. Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 4; Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 8 and 13.

³⁸ Figures for period June 2011 to May 2014. Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for period June 2011–May 2014), Form I, p. 19.

³⁹ US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” US: PM/WRA and CISR, 2019, p. 46.

⁴⁰ Ukraine is currently establishing a mine action program and has yet to survey the SHA. Figures given for clearance in 2017 are for clearance by HALO Trust. See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Ukraine: Mine Action,” 12 November 2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.

⁴¹ Land release figures for Phase 5a of the clearance of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, November 2016–March 2018 are given as 4.81km². UK, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 6, and Annex 1, p. 5.

⁴² The figure of 0.64km² is for clearance as part of the emergency response (2016–2018) in four governorates. The figures for ordnance destroyed are for five years from 2014, but with the large majority having been cleared in the years 2016–2018. Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, pp. 14–15; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form J, p. 25.

In several states not party, mine clearance was known to have occurred between 2014–2018, although it was not formally reported. In Syria, international and national operators, both civilian and military have been undertaking clearance. There are media reports of clearance in India, and in Iran, commercial clearance occurred in oil- and gas-producing areas.⁴³

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT THROUGH TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENTS

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.

Since the Mine Ban Treaty came in to force in 1999, 32 states and areas have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory. Thirty of these were States Parties, one state not party (Nepal), and one other area (Taiwan).

The first States Parties to declare themselves mine-free were Germany in 1997 and Bulgaria and Hungary in 1999. Both Germany and Hungary later found SHAs, which were verified in 2013. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 before the Mine Ban Treaty was created. In the first 10 years of treaty implementation (1999–2009), 10 States Parties declared themselves mine-free. This compares to 20 States Parties in the period 2010–2018.

In the last five years (2014–2018), five States Parties have declared themselves mine-free: Algeria 2017; Burundi 2014; Mauritania 2017;⁴⁴ Montenegro 2014; and Mozambique 2015. No state was declared free of antipersonnel mine contamination in 2018.

Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1997

1997	Germany (2013, after verification)	2009	Albania, Greece (2013, after verification), Rwanda, Tunisia, Zambia
1999	Bulgaria, Hungary (2013, after verification)	2010	Nicaragua
2003	Costa Rica	2011	Burundi (2014, after verification)
2004	Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname	2012	Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda
2005	Guatemala	2013	Bhutan, Venezuela
2006	North Macedonia	2014	Montenegro
2007	Eswatini	2015	Mozambique (2017, after verification)
2008	France, Malawi	2017	Algeria, Mauritania

Several States Parties have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines, although subsequent survey and verification revealed previously unknown SHAs. Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, and Mozambique have all cleared and/or verified these

⁴³ ICBL-CMC, *Landmine Monitor 2018*, www.the-monitor.org/LMM2018.

⁴⁴ Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and on 29 November 2018 at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, announced that it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 of the treaty.

suspected contaminated areas and fulfilled their Article 5 obligations. Algeria completed clearance of all known minefields in 2017 but continues to find and clear isolated mines.

Two States Parties that originally declared completion of clearance are now considered to be contaminated. Nigeria was declared mine-free in 2011, but during 2017–2019, antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature emplaced by Boko Haram have been reported in the northeast of the country. Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 but following verification work found further contamination in the Jordan Valley and along its northern border with Syria. Jordan undertook a process to verify and check these areas, and as of June 2018, stated that no further action is needed.⁴⁵

PROGRESS ON MEETING ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES

At the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of September 2019, 28 States Parties currently have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines after 2025 – Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028). Palestine and Sri Lanka became States Parties in 2018 and are within their first 10-year deadline for completion of their Article 5 obligations. While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative/paperwork issues to be settled at the beginning of 2026.⁴⁶

Yemen (current deadline March 2023) and BiH (current deadline March 2021) have both requested interim extensions to enable them to better define their remaining contamination. It is expected that both will submit further extension requests in March 2022 and March 2020 respectively. It is also expected that Iraq will require more time to assess the extent of new contamination. South Sudan has reported it is unlikely to meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline and that it intends to submit an additional extension request for a period of five years beyond its July 2021 deadline.⁴⁷

Zimbabwe, a State Party since 1999, has requested the most extensions to its Article 5 deadlines. Its fifth extension request has a deadline of 31 December 2025. Zimbabwe’s demining program was constrained by economic sanctions, a shortage of equipment, and a lack of international assistance.⁴⁸ However, Zimbabwe is now likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations, as are Sri Lanka, DRC, and Peru. It is also feasible that Chile, Ecuador, Jordan, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, and the UK can complete clearance before 2025.



Deminer Rabih Zein at work in northern Lebanon.
©O. van den Broeck/HI, November 2018

⁴⁵ Email from Col. Mohammed Breikat, National Director, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR), 19 September 2019.

⁴⁶ Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, additional information submitted 21 June 2018, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Presentation by Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7–8 June 2018.

⁴⁸ Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban Treaty Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 24 November 2008.

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of any deadline extensions as of October 2019

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (No. of request)	Current deadline	Remaining contamination
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years (1st)	1 March 2023	210.24km² (121.63km ² CHA, 88.61km ² SHA) ⁴⁹
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years (1st) 8 years (2nd)	31 December 2025	105.05km² ⁵⁰
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years (1st) 3 years (2nd)	1 March 2023	See UK obligations
BiH	1 March 2009	10 years (1st) 2 years (2nd)	1 March 2021	1,113km² (1,018km ² SHA, 95km ² CHA) ⁵¹
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years (1st) 6 years (2nd)	31 December 2025	890km² ⁵²
Chad	1 November 2009	14 months (1st) 3 years (2nd) 6 years (3rd) 4 years (4th)	1 January 2024	121.96km² (7 CHAs, 421 SHAs) ⁵³
Chile	1 March 2012	8 years (1st)	1 March 2020	4.45km² ⁵⁴
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years (1st)	1 March 2021	46.02km² ⁵⁵ (Extent unknown but officially estimated)
Croatia	1 March 2009	10 years (1st) 7 years (2nd)	1 March 2026	355.5km² (220.34km ² CHA, 135.21km ² SHA) ⁵⁶
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years (1st) 3 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd)	1 July 2022	1.7km² ⁵⁷ (1.29km ² SHA, 0.43km ² CHA)
DRC	1 November 2012	26 months (1st) 6 years (2nd)	1 January 2021	0.74km² ⁵⁸
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years (1st) 3 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2022	0.08km² ⁵⁹ (4 areas, SHA)

⁴⁹ As of December 2018. Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 6.

⁵⁰ As of April 2019. Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.

⁵¹ As of end 2018. BiH, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 7. There are discrepancies with the data provided in the Second Mine Ban Treaty Extension Request, March 2018.

⁵² As of December 2018. Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 5. CMAA, "National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025," p. 9, gives the figure as 946km².

⁵³ Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, HCND, Chad, 19 June 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

⁵⁴ As of December 2018. Chile, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form F, p. 17.

⁵⁵ Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 30 April 2018. The statement of Colombia at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26–30 November 2018, stated that estimated contamination was 51.24km², but this amount was reportedly reduced through demining efforts.

⁵⁶ As of end 2018. Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 9.

⁵⁷ As of May 2019. UNMAS, "Programmes: Cyprus," May 2019, www.unmas.org/en/programmes/cyprus.

⁵⁸ As of December 2018. DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 4. This is more than the 0.50km² recorded in 2017. It is reported that 30 new zones of 470,782m² were identified.

⁵⁹ As of 31 December 2018. Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 9.

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (No. of request)	Current deadline	Remaining contamination
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1st) 5 years (2nd)	1 February 2020	33.5km² ⁶⁰ (SHA)
Ethiopia	1 June 2015	5 years (1st) 5 years (2nd)	31 December 2025	1,056km² ⁶¹ (SHA 1,050km ² , CHA 6.30km ²)
Iraq	1 February 2018	10 years (1st)	1 February 2028	1,206.5km² ⁶²
Jordan	1 May 2009	3 years (1st)	1 May 2012	4.38km² (required verification) ⁶³
Niger	1 September 2009	2 years* (1st) 1 year (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2020	0.235km² (CHA 0.039km ² , SHA 0.196km ²) ⁶⁴
Palestine	1 June 2028	N/A	N/A	0.4km² (CHA)
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years (1st) 7 years (2nd)	31 December 2024	0.35km² ⁶⁵
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years (1st) 5 years (2nd)	1 March 2021	0.49km² ⁶⁶
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years (1st) 4 years (2nd)	1 March 2023	1.73km² ⁶⁷ (8 areas in 4 villages)
Somalia	1 October 2022	N/A	N/A	72.189km² (28 CHA, 46 SHA) ⁶⁸
South Sudan	9 July 2021	N/A	N/A	29.78km² ⁶⁹ (CHA 3.27km ² , SHA 26.50km ²)

⁶⁰ As of December 2013. Eritrea, Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8. No updates on the extent of contamination since 2013.

⁶¹ As of April 2019. Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 4; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 9.

⁶² As of December 2019. Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), pp. 20–21. This compares to the 1,195.56km² of contamination identified in Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, pp. 26 and 78. The extent of recent contamination has not been fully quantified.

⁶³ At end 2018. Jordan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), pp. 13–14. At the end of 2017, the total area in need of verification was just under 4.25km² across a total of 54 areas (36 in the Jordan Valley and 18 in the northern borders).

⁶⁴ Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2013–April 2018), Annex 1, p. 19.

⁶⁵ As of December 2018. Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form F, p. 11.

⁶⁶ As of 31 December 2018. Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 3. This figure is inconsistent with figures given in the Article 7 reports of previous years.

⁶⁷ As of April 2019. Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.

⁶⁸ Full extent of contamination is still unknown. Somalia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 5. This number is slightly different to survey conducted before 2018, which gave the figure 72.289km². Somalia notes in the Article 7 report for 2018 that it was not able to provide a full picture of landmine contamination due to the transfer of the IMSMA database from UNMAS to SEMA. Different figures for the extent of contamination are also provided on p. 20.

⁶⁹ South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 3.

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (No. of request)	Current deadline	Remaining contamination
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028	N/A	N/A	24km²⁷⁰ (CHA 22.42km ² , SHA 1.30km ²)
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years (1st) 4 years (2nd)	1 April 2023	18.91km²⁷¹ (CHA 2.40km ² , SHA 16.51km ²)
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years (1st) 6 years (2nd)	1 April 2025	12.09km²⁷² (CHA 7.9km ² , SHA 4.19km ²)
Thailand	1 May 2009	9 years (1st) 5 years (2nd)	31 October 2023	360km²⁷³ (SHA in 13 affected provinces and 29 districts)
Turkey	1 March 2014	8 years (1st)	1 March 2022	157.32km²⁷⁴ (in addition to 701 SHAs, extent unknown)
Ukraine	1 June 2016	5 years (1st)	1 June 2021	Unknown Preliminary estimate of 7000km ²⁷⁵
UK	1 March 2009	10 years (1st) 5 years (2nd)	1 March 2024	6.44km²⁷⁶
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd)	1 March 2023	323.48km²⁷⁷ (but with large amounts of new contamination including re-contamination of previous areas cleared) ⁷⁸
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	22 months (1st) 2 years (2nd) 2 years (3rd) 3 years (4th) 8 years (5th)	31 December 2025	52.63km²⁷⁹

*Niger's first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of the state's Article 5 deadline.

⁷⁰ As of April 2019. Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 9.

⁷¹ As of 31 December 2018. Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 8.

⁷² As of 31 December 2018. Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, pp. 5 and 6.

⁷³ As of December 2018. Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 3. In the Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan 2018–2023, TMAC, March 2019, p. 11, it records the remaining contamination in 10 provinces and four regions.

⁷⁴ As of December 2018. Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 8.

⁷⁵ Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 1.

⁷⁶ As of 31 March 2018. Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), 21 August 2018.

⁷⁷ As of 1 March 2017. Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 31 March 2017, Form D, pp. 4 and 9.

⁷⁸ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9.

⁷⁹ As of end 2018. Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 2.

EXTENSION REQUESTS IN 2019

In 2019, six countries requested extensions to their Article 5 deadlines: Argentina, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.

Argentina: Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK.⁸⁰ In March 2018, the UK formally submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by an additional five years until 1 March 2024 to complete the demining of the islands.⁸¹ In March 2019, Argentina submitted an extension request for an additional three years until 1 March 2023.⁸² This is a shorter timeframe than the 2018 UK extension deadline of 1 March 2024.

Cambodia: Despite over 25 years of humanitarian mine action, Cambodia has only addressed half of its antipersonnel mine contamination.⁸³ In April 2019, Cambodia submitted a second extension request for six years (2020–2025). Factors that may constrain compliance with the new extension request include un-demarcated border areas; available resources; inaccessible areas; competing development priorities and demands; and data discrepancies.⁸⁴ Cambodia also states that an additional 2,000 deminers will be needed to meet the 2025 goal,⁸⁵ along with US\$165.3 million, from 1 January 2020–31 December 2025.⁸⁶

Chad: Chad has requested four extensions to its Article 5 deadline to clear landmines from its territories, the most recent request of which was in April 2019 for a four-year extension until 2024. Despite each extension request including a plan to conduct survey to better understand the extent of contamination, the full extent of the problem remains unknown.⁸⁷ Lack of funding has been a recurring challenge for Chad in meeting its Article 5 obligations. Other factors have included issues related to weak management, security problems, and poor road networks.⁸⁸

Ethiopia: Ethiopia has requested two extensions to its Mine Ban Treaty deadline, one submitted in March 2015 for five years until 1 June 2020,⁸⁹ and a second in 2019 for the period 2020–2025.⁹⁰ Ethiopia provided several reasons for failing to comply with its Article 5 deadlines, including insecurity; the lack of services and infrastructure necessary for demining operations; continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered mined areas; the lack of precise information on the number and location of mined areas; and the identification of additional hazardous areas.⁹¹ The 2019 extension request also cites insufficient donor funding as a key challenge to achieving the Article 5 commitment.⁹² The cost of meeting the Article 5 deadline is estimated by Ethiopia to be \$40,958,157, six million less than the first extension request.⁹³

⁸⁰ Statement of Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 30 November 2009.

⁸¹ UK, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018.

⁸² Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2019.

⁸³ Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 6.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 7. Cambodia is considering deploying Royal Cambodian Army soldiers to meet this need, p. 9.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 55. This figure does not include an additional US\$8.1 million for clearance of antivehicle mines; \$38.6 million for management and coordination; \$118.9 million for cluster munitions clearance; or \$41.3 million for ERW clearance. The total sum is \$372.2 million.

⁸⁷ Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 April 2019.

⁸⁸ NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 30; “Tchad: grève des démineurs restés 10 mois sans salaire” (“Chad: deminers strike after 10 months without pay”), *Agence de Presse Africaine*, 10 May 2017, <http://apanews.net/fr/news/tchad-greve-des-deminers-restes-10-mois-sans-salaire>; and email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2017.

⁸⁹ Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.

⁹⁰ Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 8–9.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 9, 14–15.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 11.

Tajikistan: Tajikistan submitted its second Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2019. The request is for an additional six years until 2025. The reasons given for not meeting its original 2020 deadline included insecurity along its border with Afghanistan and lack of permission to conduct demining in some of the western districts. Mined areas were reported as difficult to access and minefield records of poor quality.⁹⁴ Tajikistan also reported that survey work along the Tajik-Afghan border between 2010 and 2018 had identified an additional 41 mined areas (a total of 10.48km²), which had impeded progress towards the achievement of its Article 5 commitments.⁹⁵ The average clearance projected for each of the six years of the extension until 2020 is 1.5km² per year,⁹⁶ although in the last five years Tajikistan has cleared only 2.61km² of mined area. The preliminary estimated cost for the six-year extension until 2025 was \$30 million, not including a \$480,000 contribution from the Tajikistan state budget.⁹⁷

Yemen: Yemen became a State Party in 1999 and has since had two five-year extensions to its deadline to meet its Article 5 obligation. Since April 2015, an escalation in conflict has disrupted clearance activity and shifted priorities to the emergency clearance of mines and ERW.⁹⁸ In March 2019, Yemen submitted a request for a third extension until 1 March 2023. Drawn up in consultation with UN Development Programme (UNDP), the request proposes an interim emergency response with the aim to conduct a national contamination survey in areas where security permits, to provide a realistic baseline for a subsequent 10-year extension request.⁹⁹ In addition to conducting the baseline, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) also aims to produce a revised workplan to meet its Article 5 obligation; to revise the national standards and strengthen the information management system; and to establish a coordination body.¹⁰⁰

Eritrea: Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 1 February 2020, but it has yet to submit an extension request. It will be in violation of the treaty as of 1 February 2020 if it fails to submit a request for approval by States Parties at the November 2019 Review Conference in Oslo. Eritrea has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014 and failed to submit an updated Article 5 workplan as required by States Parties when granting its second deadline extension.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVING CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS

Considerable progress has been made since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, but there is still a need to increase the pace of survey and clearance activities to meet Article 5 obligations as soon as possible and to ensure significant progress towards the ambition of a mine-free world by 2025. There are still a number of challenges to be addressed by States Parties, but also opportunities that can assist States Parties to complete their obligations.

FUNDING

Several mine-affected countries are facing significant funding shortfalls, hampering their ability to meet their Article 5 deadline obligations. In the last five years, inadequate funding has been cited as a challenge by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH,

⁹⁴ Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018; and interview, in Dushanbe, 30 May 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

⁹⁵ Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 37; and Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2019, p. 1.

⁹⁶ Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 8.

⁹⁷ Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 9 and 23.

⁹⁸ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, pp. 4 and 5.

¹⁰⁰ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 25.

Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.

Reasons cited for the lack of funding for some countries include funding being prioritized for countries with new emergencies rather than legacy contamination and a reduction in funding to countries that have achieved or are close to reaching middle-income status.¹⁰¹ In the past, Serbia has reported that mine clearance operations were affected when donor funding transferred to cluster munition clearance.¹⁰² DRC has found mine action funding affected by the prioritization of funds for other humanitarian emergencies, including the recent Ebola outbreak.¹⁰³

As the majority of funding comes from just a few donors, the top five being the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the UK, Norway, and Germany,¹⁰⁴ the loss of funding from a donor can dramatically impact a country's mine action program. For example, Angola faced a reduction in funding for its mine action program following the loss of EU funding in 2016¹⁰⁵ and US funding in April 2018.¹⁰⁶

Most States Parties do contribute an annual budget towards the cost of demining activities, although this is rarely enough to support their full mine action program. Government funds are often allocated to particular aspects of the demining program, particularly institutional support and salaries. The government of Angola has provided significant funding for mine clearance, although this has been almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects.

A few States Parties cover the full costs of mine action. Peru, in its revised second extension request, submitted in August 2016, estimated that US\$38.6 million would be needed to complete clearance, all of which was due to be funded by the Peruvian government.¹⁰⁷ However, Peru also reported that while \$3.88 million had been costed for 2018, the actual amount set in the annual budget was \$2.36 million.¹⁰⁸

BORDER CONTROL AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Several States Parties have stated that meeting their Article 5 deadlines is contingent on agreement around borders and territorial control.

A large proportion of mine contamination affects disputed areas along state borders, and a lack of agreement between states has hindered survey and clearance operations. For example, the current estimation of CHAs and SHAs in Ethiopia does not include information on contamination in the border areas between Ethiopia and Eritrea due to a lack of border demarcation preventing access and survey.¹⁰⁹ The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was terminated in 2008 and all mine action activities ceased. Ethiopia's 2018 extension request notes that Ethiopia expects the discussion regarding the border areas will continue with the establishment of a joint border commission, although no indication was given as to when this will be established.¹¹⁰

¹⁰¹ Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, "State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment," MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017, p. 8.

¹⁰² Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, p. 11.

¹⁰³ NPA, "Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019," 1 August 2019, p. 116.

¹⁰⁴ See the Landmine Monitor chapter on Mine Action Support.

¹⁰⁵ Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018; and Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, "State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment," MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

¹⁰⁷ Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), July 2016, p. 18.

¹⁰⁸ Peru, Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 11.

¹⁰⁹ Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 34.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.



An NPA multi-task team clearing a minefield surrounded by tobacco plantations in Lebanon.

©NPA, June 2019

Tajikistan's ability to meet its new deadline partly rests on agreement of border clearance with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan notes that both states have agreed for a joint commission to investigate the minefields and schedule clearance, but they are unable to provide an exact timetable.¹¹¹ Negotiations are also occurring with Afghanistan and border forces regarding access to and security for survey and clearance in some of the border areas.

The border between Thailand and Cambodia is still heavily contaminated and much of it has been subject to demarcation dispute, preventing effective clearance by either state. Both states have cited this as an obstacle to achieving their Article 5 deadline. However, in recent years, Cambodia and Thailand have come to agreement regarding their cooperation on the survey and clearance of these areas.¹¹²

There have been other positive developments among States Parties to agree clearance along their borders. Croatia signed an agreement with Hungary in 2016 to demine the border as part of a cross-border cooperation project with some of this clearance completed in 2017. In 2000, Ecuador and Peru established the Binational Cooperation Program (Programa Binacional de Cooperación), and a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining was adopted in 2013 to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The Ecuador-Peru Binational Demining Unit will carry out clearance of minefields along the border area, although the workplans of each country are slightly contradictory as to the amount of land to be cleared and when this will be done.¹¹³

In several states, clearance of landmines is impeded due to disputes over territorial control. While Cyprus stated in July 2013 that there were no remaining minefields in territories under its effective control,¹¹⁴ landmine contamination remains in the buffer zone and in the Turkish-controlled areas. The breakdown of settlement talks facilitated by the UN in July 2017 resulted in access to SHAs being denied to the UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus.¹¹⁵ Turkey, which has mines along its borders with Syria, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan has only made marginal progress in addressing mine contamination in its territories, and its most recent extension request in 2013 does not include the clearance of mines in Northern Cyprus.

Mine action in Palestine is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas according to civil and security control of Palestine and Israel. Most minefields are in Area C, where Israel has full civil and security control and will not authorize clearance by Palestinians.¹¹⁶

Ukraine also reported in its first Article 5 deadline extension request that it did not have access to some of the mined areas due to the occupying authority of the Russian Federation,

¹¹¹ Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2019, p. 5.

¹¹² "CMAC, Thai forces to clear mines at border provinces," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 24 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/2pRUu9t>; and Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 44.

¹¹³ Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional information, 8 September 2017, p. 10; and Peru, Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 17.

¹¹⁴ Cyprus, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.

¹¹⁵ Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Pearce, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

¹¹⁶ State of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (voluntary report for period 1 August 2012–31 July 2013), p. 10.

which also prevented survey to understand the scale of contamination.¹¹⁷ Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and has argued that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the islands.

CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT

Mine action has typically occurred in post-conflict situations, but protracted conflict is increasingly resulting in mine action taking place in complex, insecure contexts that restricts or prevents access to areas, slows progress, and endangers the lives of deminers and other mine action staff.

In 2018–2019, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Insecurity restricted access to some areas that are or may be affected by antipersonnel mines in States Parties Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Security and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan have affected clearance operations, slowing down and sometimes halting the progress of mine clearance.¹¹⁸ Some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators due to ongoing conflict between the government, the Taliban and other armed groups. In other areas, demining teams must gain the consent of all relevant parties.

In Colombia, the armed actions by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), and drug-trafficking groups impact the ability for humanitarian demining groups to conduct survey and clearance.¹¹⁹ Humanitarian demining operators had vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in the suspension of operations.

Ongoing conflict in Yemen means that the national contamination survey outlined in its 2019 extension request can only be conducted in areas where security permits.¹²⁰

In the last five years, there have been several cases of humanitarian deminers killed, injured, or taken hostage in conflict-related attacks. In Afghanistan, 14 security incidents were reported in 2017, including a deminer murdered by anti-government elements in Nangarhar province in September. A total of 97 staff were abducted but later returned. Operators also reported equipment losses, including detectors, VHF radios, and mobile phones.¹²¹ In 2018, six deminers were killed and 18 injured as a result of security incidents.¹²²

In South Sudan, the release of mined areas plummeted in 2017 largely due to security concerns from the ongoing conflict, which significantly impeded mine action operations during the year. Four mine action personnel were seriously injured in an ambush, and there were several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups.

However, despite ongoing conflict and insecurity, States Parties have also been able to make progress. In Iraq, operations have been undertaken to tackle the massive contamination

¹¹⁷ Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.

¹¹⁸ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2012, p. 7.

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and Mine Action Review interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, in Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda and Sergio Mahecha, NPA, in Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, in San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Charles Cagua Zambrano and Francisco Profeta Cardoso, CCCM, in Centro Poblado de Santo Domingo, 11 August 2018.

¹²⁰ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, pp. 4 and 5.

¹²¹ Statement of UNMAS/DMAC, “UNMAS Afghanistan and DMAC strongly condemn brutal murder of an Afghan deminer in Nangarhar,” 12 September 2017. UNAMA reported three humanitarian deminers killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks. See, UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018.

¹²² NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 15.

by improvised mines and other ERW found in areas recaptured from NSAG Islamic State. Yemen has focused on emergency clearance and mine risk education since the outbreak of conflict in 2015, and plans to embark on a national contamination survey to re-assess the extent of the problem in the country.

In states like Iraq and Colombia where recent conflict has created fear, insecurity, and mistrust in government or outside groups, mine action operators have increasingly drawn on community liaison as part of their mine action approach to build community understanding of operations and enable access to affected areas.

IMPROVISED MINES AND OTHER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has dramatically increased in conflict areas in recent years, particularly in areas where insurgent forces are fighting. When victim-activated, these devices are also known as improvised mines or mines of an improvised nature. IEDs are often designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and so meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine and fall under the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties have several obligations with regards to improvised antipersonnel mines. This includes reporting any confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination in their Article 7 transparency reports, making resources available to assess the extent of contamination, and to developing appropriate strategies to address it. States Parties are also required to exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing improvised mines. Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the costs of equipment and resources needed to deal with improvised mines, which may be higher than dealing with factory-manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress towards meeting Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. A report published in 2017 recommended that contamination by improvised mines needs to be included within existing information management and reporting structures to ensure its location and extent is captured and a systematic response is conducted.¹²³

In the last five years, confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination and/or incidents and casualties were reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen, and states not party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

Afghanistan issued a policy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) in May 2018 that set out a number of principles to be followed by implementing partners. The Afghanistan Department for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that improvised mines are now being surveyed as SHA or CHA and when entered into Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) they are included as part of the Article 5 workplan.¹²⁴ The extent of this new contamination has yet to be determined by survey, but preliminary estimates in 17 of 22 affected provinces identified 152 hazards covering 228km².

In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) introduced a national standard on IEDs in 2016 and is working with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to update the standard to take into account the experience gained in tackling the dense contamination of improvised devices in areas liberated from Islamic State since 2016. However, it was not included in Iraq's 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request or in its Article 7 report for 2017. Iraq must consider improvised mine contamination as part of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations.

¹²³ Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, "Policy Brief: The Ottawa Treaty's 2025 Goal for Clearance," MAG and HALO Trust, 2018, p. 12.

¹²⁴ Email from Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi Abdul Qudos Ziaee and Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 29 August 2019.

ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE, AND TOPOGRAPHY

Several States Parties face the challenge of undertaking mine clearance in difficult environments which can slow the pace of clearance and increase costs.

In some countries, mine clearance has been prioritized in populated and more accessible areas, leaving the more remote and challenging areas to be tackled last. Chile is moving into the final phase of operations but has stated that it will face considerable challenges to clearance of the remaining contamination due to climate and topography. The mined areas in the Altiplano and the Austral Islands are difficult to access and are subject to heavy rains and snow, which restrict the length of the demining season.¹²⁵ At the beginning of operations in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas the UK prioritized the clearance of areas closest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, resulting in the release of areas closest to Port Stanley. The remaining minefields, cleared from 2018 onwards are particularly environmentally sensitive and challenging to clear due to penguin breeding areas and beach and sand dune areas.¹²⁶ The UK has therefore increased its funding commitment for this phase up to £27 million compared to the £11 million for the first four stages.¹²⁷

In addition to the challenges of conducting clearance in remote and environmentally sensitive areas, there has been increasing use of IEDs in highly populated urban environments, the extent of which is creating new challenges for States Parties and mine action operators. In Iraq, Islamic State used improvised mines and booby-traps extensively in urban areas such as Mosul. Survey and clearance work in three-dimensional operating environments where the boundary between safe and unsafe areas is often less clear is challenging. In addition, the contamination in Iraq is often buried in building rubble resulting from heavy coalition airstrikes, which further complicates survey and clearance.

Natural disasters have also impacted on the progress of a few States Parties towards meeting their clearance obligations. Ecuador submitted a second request to extend its mine clearance deadline for three months until 31 December 2017 due to a serious earthquake on 16 April 2016, which required the diversion of the armed forces away from demining.¹²⁸

SURVEY AND LAND RELEASE

The resources for responding to landmine contamination are costly and limited and make it important to ensure that assets are deployed to achieve as much as possible. A major part of this is understanding where landmines are and where they are not. Under Article 5, States Parties are required to “make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.” However, identifying the true extent of contamination has been problematic for many States Parties.

The first global effort to understand the extent of contamination through the implementation of Landmine Impact Surveys was identified as bringing a more collaborative and deliberative approach and producing reports, databases, and outputs providing a more accurate description and analysis of the mine/unexploded ordinance (UXO) problems, thus providing a better basis for mine action decisions.¹²⁹ However, in many countries the surveys were also found to greatly over-estimate the extent of contamination. In addition, the

¹²⁵ Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.

¹²⁶ Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July 2017, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 11.

¹²⁷ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 10.

¹²⁸ Letter from Efraín Baus Palacios, Director of Neighborhood Relations and Sovereignty, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, President of the National Humanitarian Demining Center of Ecuador, to Amb. Patricia O’Brian, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN in Geneva, and Chair of the Article 5 Committee, Note No. 14839-DRVS/CENDESMI, Quito, 26 November 2016.

¹²⁹ Demex and Scanteam, “Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process, Final Report,” Oslo, November 2003, p. 1.

systems to reduce SHAs were often over-cautious and wasteful, with an average of less than 3% of cleared land containing mines or UXO.¹³⁰

The introduction of evidence-based decision-making processes through a combination of non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance has greatly contributed toward increasing understanding of contamination and enabling more land to be released through cancelation and reduction, allowing for clearance resources to be targeted to land that is known to contain landmines.

Almost all States Parties that implement systematic mine clearance programs today now use land release methodologies (survey and clearance). This has led to significant advancement in understanding the actual extent of contamination, the cancelation or release of large areas of land previously considered contaminated, and better estimates of clearance timelines. For example:

- In Angola, survey was conducted in the lead up to the development of its 2017 extension request. All 18 provinces are now reported as surveyed and the process of non-technical survey allowed for significant cancelation, by as much as 90%, to the areas recorded in the database of the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH).¹³¹
- In Cambodia, analysis of the data from 2014–2016 from the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) national database showed that 40% of land was released through non-technical survey and 60% through technical survey and clearance.¹³²
- Between 2014 and 2018, Croatia released 90.4km² of previously suspected land through survey. Croatia plans to further reduce SHA in the period 2019–2026.¹³³
- South Sudan's national mine action program has improved the accuracy of its estimates of contamination from landmines and other ERW since 2018. Re-survey of contaminated areas combined with an improvement in security conditions in certain areas and an overhaul of the mine action database contributed to the reduction of contamination from 89km² reported at the start of 2018, to 39.4km² at the end of the year.
- In Sri Lanka, non-technical survey began in June 2015 and was completed in February 2017. The estimates of total contamination have fallen sharply: from 506km² at the end of 2010, to 98km² at the end of 2012, to nearly 68.4km² in 2015, and down to just under 24km² as of April 2019.¹³⁴
- In 2012, land release methodology was introduced in Thailand, which has allowed the accelerated release of safe land. Thailand estimates that at the time of its Article 5 extension request in March 2017, it had released around 80% of the total reported contamination.¹³⁵
- Non-technical survey in Zimbabwe between 2013 and 2016 resulted in the cancelation of around 93% of SHAs.¹³⁶ Zimbabwe has reported that having completed survey, efforts are now focused on clearance. Zimbabwe is likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations by 2025.

In some States Parties, plans are underway to increase the use of land release approaches. In BiH, a country-wide assessment is to be conducted in 2018–2019 to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and help to improve the efficiency of follow on survey and clearance operations. It is not clear if this has started.

¹³⁰ ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World*, www.the-monitor.org/LMM2008.

¹³¹ Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 August 2017, p. 5.

¹³² CMAA, "National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025," p. 9.

¹³³ Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Croatia, 20 September 2019. Land release was as follows: 2014: 46.2km²; 2015: 27.1km²; 2016: 3.3km²; 2017: 6.6km²; and 2018: 7.2km².

¹³⁴ Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 9.

¹³⁵ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, p. 4.

¹³⁶ Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 41.

The extent of contamination in both Ethiopia and Ukraine is currently extensive and it is expected that in both cases the SHA will be reduced through survey. In Ethiopia, it is expected that only about 2% of SHA will contain mines once survey is conducted.¹³⁷

However, most States Parties still do not have a clear understanding of the full extent of their remaining contamination. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that only seven of the 25 States Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their reporting: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.



As a potential helicopter landing site, several charges with detonators were placed around this area in Colombia.

©Nadège Mazars/HI, 2018

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

The Maputo Action Plan makes specific reference to cooperation and partnership and that States Parties should take greater ownership over their responsibilities, including national funding and management of mine action programs.

Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state's clearance obligations with a few exceptions:

- In Cyprus the mine action program has been coordinated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).¹³⁸
- In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget. In July 2018, SEMA reported that it was lobbying to get the necessary legislation passed in parliament and that once approved, SEMA would have a dedicated budget line included in the national budget.¹³⁹
- In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, this has not yet occurred. This appears to be a result of financial and technical limitations of the NMAA that prevented effective management of operations and a change in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted capacity-building of government institutions. However, in March 2019, UNMAS reported that it is preparing to transfer management and coordination responsibility to the NMAA.¹⁴⁰
- In Ukraine, a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center is being developed with support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Project-Coordinator and the GICHD.

¹³⁷ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 10 and 35. However, Ethiopia has reported different estimates of the percentage of SHAs expected to be confirmed, between 0.5% and 3%. See the Revised National Mine Action Plan for 2017–2020, October 2017, pp. 1–3, & 9; statement of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 42.

¹³⁸ Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Peace, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

¹³⁹ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form J.

¹⁴⁰ UNMAS, "Programmes: South Sudan," updated March 2019, www.unmas.org/en/programmes/southsudan.

The donors have agreed to an extension of the project until the end of 2018, due to delays in the adoption of the mine action law.¹⁴¹ This project has now received funding until October 2020.¹⁴²

- In Yemen, YEMAC has been split due to the conflict, with one part based in Sanaa under the control of the Houthi armed movement and the other part in the southern city of Aden under the control of the Adrabbuh Mansur-led Yemeni government, supported by the Saudi and UAE-led coalition. The Sanaa office coordinates operations in the north and center of the country, while the Aden office oversees operations in southern provinces.

States Parties Nigeria and Oman do not have national mine action programs.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND STANDARDS

Since 1999, the GICHD has supported the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has supported States Parties to work towards the fulfillment of their Article 5 treaty-mandated obligations by providing capacity development and technical support in developing mine action strategies and plans; in implementing more effective and efficient land release processes; in managing mine action data through the use of the IMSMA; and in incorporating gender and diversity considerations into mine action programs.

The GICHD has supported UNMAS in managing the development and review of the IMAS, which have provided guidance and defined international requirements and specifications for mine action operations, enabling mine action programs globally to improve their safety and efficiency and to develop national mine action standards that reflect specific local realities and conditions.

The IMAS and the support from GICHD and its partners have supported States Parties (and some states not party) to improve and professionalize their mine action programs. It has also contributed towards greater consistency and accuracy in the reporting of land release targets and classifications as required in the Article 7 transparency reports. Most States Parties (26) have national mine action standards in place. Serbia and the UK both use IMAS, and DRC, Niger, and Ukraine have standards that are being reviewed or drafted. At least 19 States Parties use a version of IMSMA, and at least 25 States Parties have mine action strategic plans and/or workplans in place.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLEARANCE TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Mine Action was initially framed in meeting the basic security needs of people, although in the wake of the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), mine action is increasingly being considered not only in terms of its humanitarian contribution, but also in terms of its contribution to longer-term development and socio-economic recovery. Mine action reporting, which initially focused mainly on outputs in terms of mines cleared and amount of land cleared, has adopted a stronger focus on outcomes and impacts in terms of the contribution of mine action to livelihood improvement, socio-economic recovery, and longer-term development.¹⁴³ There have also been efforts to ensure that mine clearance is prioritized to first meet the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable. In some States Parties, the mine action programs have spanned the years from an immediate post-war, humanitarian response to longer-term development.

¹⁴¹ "Mine Action Activities," Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and UN Advisors, 17 February 2016.

¹⁴² NPA, "The Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants," 1 August 2019, p. 164.

¹⁴³ GICHD and UNDP, "Leaving No One Behind. Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals," Geneva, 2017, p. 26.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 SDGs were adopted by the UN Member States in January 2016. A study conducted by the GICHD and UNDP in 2017 recommended that while country-specific areas of work such as mine action are not explicitly identified in the SDGs, they can be addressed through the national-level SDG adaptation processes.¹⁴⁴ This can support States Parties in accelerating progress toward meeting treaty obligations, both in prioritizing mine action as a facilitator to meet the 2025 obligations and as a means to leverage funding.

Mine action-related activities have been integrated into national development plans, poverty reduction strategy papers, UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), or UNDP Country Programme documents by several countries.¹⁴⁵ States Parties have also highlighted the importance of the link between mine action and broader development goals within their mine action strategies. For example:

- Afghanistan, in its National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020) has as its first goal the aim to facilitate development. This includes the sector improving understanding of how mine action contributes to human security and socio-economic development.¹⁴⁶
- Cambodia adopted a specific SDG 18 to End the Negative Impact of Mines/ERW and Promote Victim Assistance. This includes the target to clear all identified mine and ERW-contaminated areas by the year 2030.¹⁴⁷ Mine action is also tied in closely with local development plans through a local-level planning process. Targets and indicators are being developed by the CMAA in terms of the contribution of mine action to other SDGs, including eradicating poverty, achieving zero hunger, promoting good health, ensuring decent work, and reducing inequalities. CMAA is customizing its IMSMA and training staff on data collection and analysis that will include SDG-related targets.
- Like Cambodia, state not party Lao PDR, also has an SDG specific to dealing with its ERW contamination problem. SDG 18, Lives Safe from UXO, recognizes the contribution of UXO clearance towards other SDGs, such as SDG 1, Ending Poverty.¹⁴⁸
- Zimbabwe was supported by the GICHD to develop a National Resource Mobilization Strategy that will link mine action to the SDGs. ZIMAC plans to launch the strategy before the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.¹⁴⁹
- The BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 recognizes the importance of linking mine action to the SDGs now that the country has moved on from the initial period of rehabilitation and stabilization following the conflict. The strategy commits to better understanding “the influences and possibilities brought by clearance in the sense of enabling both development and contribution to fulfilment of the SDGs,” and to the mobilization of funds for mine action.¹⁵⁰

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The importance of looking at gender and diversity in mine action has gained traction among States Parties in recent years. In relation to contamination and clearance, the consideration of gender and diversity is important in terms of the collection of information for planning and prioritization, in ensuring fair and equitable land release, and in paying attention to the gender balance on survey and clearance teams.¹⁵¹ This not only allows an inclusive approach to gender equality but also ensures that mine action has a greater and more inclusive impact.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁴⁶ Afghanistan, National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020), DMAC, 2016, p. 2.

¹⁴⁷ Cambodia, “SDG 18: End the negative impact of Mine/ERW and promote victim assistance,” undated, www.csdgs.org/en/csdgs/goals/18.

¹⁴⁸ Lao PDR, “SDG 18: Lives safe from UXO,” undated.

¹⁴⁹ Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 33.

¹⁵⁰ BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 13.

¹⁵¹ UNDP, *Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes* (New York, March 2010).

Several States Parties, particularly those with larger mine action programs, have included gender within their national mine action strategies. For example:

- Afghanistan has included gender and diversity as Goal 4 in its national mine action strategic plan with strategic objectives to develop a gender and diversity policy for the mine action program, to increase employment of women, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups, to promote gender and diversity across management and coordination, and to undertake capacity-building and awareness-raising regarding gender and diversity.¹⁵²
- BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 also acknowledges the importance of considering gender in mine action planning, implementation, and follow-up. It states the need to ensure that all mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age. The strategy also refers to the 2033 Law on Gender Equality in BiH and the Gender Equality Action Plan that supports equal representation of men and women.¹⁵³ Importantly, the mine action strategy also notes that the members of the newly established Demining Commission from the ministries of civil affairs, security and defense are also from the three constitutive nations of BiH, representing the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb peoples.¹⁵⁴
- Goal 8 within the Cambodia National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 includes the mainstreaming of gender and environmental protection in mine action.¹⁵⁵ Cambodia approved its Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan for Mine Action (2018–2022) in 2018.¹⁵⁶
- The South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022 includes a section on gender and diversity, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in South Sudan are also incorporated in the strategy.¹⁵⁷
- The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2019 of the DRC also includes a section of gender.
- The Tajikistan Mine Action Center has a National Gender Strategy.

There is evidence that some of the commitments towards gender and diversity outlined in the national strategies are being implemented. For example, the first all-women mine clearance team was established in Afghanistan in 2018.¹⁵⁸ However, while women are being recruited to clearance teams, there is less evidence of them being recruited to managerial and supervisory positions in the sector. In the DRC, it was reported that around 30% of operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female in 2019, but only around 7% of the managerial and supervisory positions were held by women.¹⁵⁹ In comparison, Tajikistan reported that it is a challenge to maintain a gender balance in demining teams due to those serving in the military being predominantly men. Tajikistan aimed to recruit more women to other roles, such as paramedics and quality management, in addition to increasing female civilian capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.¹⁶⁰

Gender and diversity still appear not to be a priority for some States Parties. Gender is not referenced in Angola's 2019–2025 Mine Ban Treaty Mine Action workplan, nor is it included

¹⁵² Afghanistan, National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020), DMAC, 2016, p. 6.

¹⁵³ BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 13.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 7.

¹⁵⁶ Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 33.

¹⁵⁷ Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, "Clearing the Mines 2018," 1 October 2018.

¹⁵⁸ NPA, "Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019," 1 August 2019, p. 14.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁶⁰ Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2019, p. 6.

in its national mine action standards in place in 2018.¹⁶¹ In some countries, the utilization of military staff for demining operations also seems to limit the number of women in the sector. A report by the GICHD in 2012 noted that most of the staff of the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was transferred from the Ministry of National Defence and included a limited number of women. The report also noted that EMAO considered demining work not to be suitable for women.¹⁶² While the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) has a National Gender Strategy, it acknowledges that it is a challenge to maintain a gender balance in demining teams due to those serving in the military being predominantly men. However, Tajikistan noted that efforts would be made to recruit women to roles such as paramedics and quality management, in addition to increasing female civilian capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.¹⁶³

RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

States that have complied with their Article 5 obligations and made all reasonable efforts to identify and clear all remaining mine contamination, may still find residual, previously unknown contamination at a later date. To ensure compliance with Article 5, States Parties have agreed to address these areas in accordance with the commitments made at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties.¹⁶⁴ These commitments are as follows:

- To immediately inform all States Parties if a mined area or newly mined area is found and to destroy all the antipersonnel mines in the mined areas as soon as possible.
- To submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible and no more than 10 years, if unable to destroy all the antipersonnel mines before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference.
- To continue reporting obligations under Article 7 of the treaty and to provide all other relevant updates.

Several States Parties found such residual contamination after declaring completion. Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Mozambique all addressed and completed their obligations under Article 5. Algeria continues to find isolated mines which it clears within the year and so is considered to be compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.

National strategies and completion plans need to make provisions for sustainable national capacity to address any previously unknown areas. Several States Parties have begun to plan for the possibility of having to deal with residual contamination following the completion of their Article 5 obligations.

- The BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 includes a section on management of residual contamination and national capacities. It specifies that the armed forces of BiH and the Administrations for Civil Protection will play a role in this, and that a strategy for dealing with the residual threat should be created by 2022.¹⁶⁵
- Goal 7 of the Cambodia National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 aims to establish national capacity to address residual mine threats after 2025. This includes strengthening national capacity, including the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, Cambodian Mine Action Center, and the police; enhancing and sharing mine action knowledge within the sector and beyond; and reviewing the legal, institutional, and operational framework to address residual threats.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 111.

¹⁶² GICHD, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia,” Geneva, March 2012, p. 8.

¹⁶³ Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 2019, p. 6.

¹⁶⁴ Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed. Submitted by Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance (Indonesia and Zambia), Geneva, 26 November 2012, <http://bit.ly/2NtkAI3>.

¹⁶⁵ BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 33.

¹⁶⁶ CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 14.



A White Helmets team provided risk education to 81 boys and 59 girls at a school in Hama Governorate, Syria

©Michael Edwards/Mayday Rescue, November 2018

CASUALTIES

OVERVIEW

Antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, including improvised landmine types, unexploded cluster submunitions,¹ and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm.

Following a sharp rise in casualties due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015, high numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2018. A total of at least 6,897 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in the calendar year. Of that total, at least 3,059 people were killed, and another 3,837 people were injured; for one casualty it was not known if the person survived or was killed.²

Although the 2018 total was less than those of the three previous years, it was still almost double the lowest determined annual number of 3,457 casualties in 2013.

It is certain that numerous casualties went unrecorded. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries do not have national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate reporting exist. In some conflict-affected countries combined numbers were reported without the granularity of data needed so that it can be adequately disaggregated and used.


For the third consecutive year, in 2018, the highest number of annual casualties was caused by improvised mines (3,789). This was also the year with the most improvised mine casualties recorded to date.

1 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions see, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2015*, www.the-monitor.org/CMM2015/VictimAssistance.

2 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor mine/ERW casualty database.

Civilians represented the majority of casualties compared to military and security forces,³ continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 71% of casualties were civilians in 2018 where the status was known. This represented a decrease in the percentage of civilian casualties from 87% in 2017 and around 80% in recent years.⁴

Mine/ERW casualties annually (1999–2018)



In 1999, on average there was more than one mine/ERW casualty occurring each hour.⁵ In 2014, at the time of the Maputo Action Plan, the casualty total had dropped significantly and the Monitor recorded an average of about 10 casualties per day. However, in 2018, the rate was nearly double that, at just below 20 casualties per day.

Since the first years of the Mine Ban Treaty, it was certain that many casualties went unrecorded. In 1999, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties, but country estimates indicated that there were another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties that were not recorded in the available data. From 1999 through 2006, the number of new mine casualties (recorded and estimated calculated together) each year was between 15,000 and 20,000. For each year between 2009 and 2014, the Monitor estimated that there have been approximately 1,000 additional casualties (in the range of an additional 20–30% of the recorded total) that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics. Subsequently, due to the highly irregular accessibility of data for countries experiencing conflict after 2014, estimating the gaps has become less feasible, even where some country estimates are available.

The global casualties total since 1999 has increased every reporting year due to new casualties recorded and also to the

States with the greatest total casualties 1999–2018

State	Casualties
Afghanistan	27,670
Colombia	10,869
Cambodia	8,802
Syria	6,093
Iraq	5,533
Iran	5,221
Pakistan	4,755
Myanmar	4,623
Yemen	4,433
India	3,832

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

³ The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as members of non-state armed groups and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.

⁴ Civilian casualties were recorded at 70% both in 2011 and 2009.

⁵ In 1999, the Monitor originally identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties.

updating of historical data with newly available statistics. More than 130,000 casualties have been recorded by Landmine Monitor just in the period since 1999.⁶


The significant increase in recorded casualties since 2014 is primarily due to large numbers of casualties in relatively few countries with intensive armed conflict—including Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as Myanmar. However, there is a clear overall trend of declining casualty numbers in most countries since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. This includes large reductions in casualties from the worst peak years in Cambodia (1,153 casualties in 1999) and Colombia (1,229 casualties in 2006).

Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised mine casualties. In Monitor casualty reporting, the term “improvised mines” is synonymous with victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), and booby-traps or are described by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush-wire IEDs. Improvised antipersonnel mines that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.


The most improvised mine casualties recorded to date (3,789) was in 2018. To put the impact of this manifestation into perspective: for 2018, the number of improvised mine casualties alone was higher than the total number of casualties caused by all mine varieties (including improvised mines and all various unexploded ordnance) in the year with the least recorded casualties (3,475 in 2013).

Since 2005, the country with the most recorded improvised mine casualties each year has also had the greatest number of total annual casualties. In 2018, Afghanistan had the most recorded improvised mine casualties of all countries (1,586), followed by Syria (1,076). For the entire period since 1999, the greatest number of improvised mine casualties were recorded in Colombia (10,428), followed by Afghanistan (8,422).

Improved mine casualties in Colombia since 1999



Improved mine casualties in Afghanistan since 1999 (first recorded for 2006)



⁶ The Monitor database includes 130,755 casualties for the period 1999–2018.

CASUALTIES IN 2018

The country with the most recorded total casualties in 2018 was State Party Afghanistan, with 2,234, followed by state not party Syria, with 1,465 casualties reported. Mine/ERW casualties were identified in a total of 50 states and other areas in 2018.⁷

Of the total recorded casualties in 2018, two-thirds (4,543 or 66%) occurred in 32 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸

CASUALTY RECORDING FOR 2018

The 6,897 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2018 only include *recorded* casualties, not estimates of casualties.⁹ It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are not captured in the Monitor's global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in those countries.

In Afghanistan, data collection was affected by conflict and coverage declined due to the national Red Crescent Society no longer conducting casualty survey. Reporting of military casualties was generally rare in past years. After May 2017, the Afghan military stopped releasing its conflict casualty figures completely. However, more armed forces and non-state armed group (NSAG) casualties were recorded by the Monitor in 2018 than in previous years from other sources.¹⁰ Monitor casualty data for 2018 includes 1,435 casualties recorded by Afghanistan's Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) and another 799, mostly military casualties, from analysis of casualties documented in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) compilation of media coverage of conflict incidents.¹¹ The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported attributing an increase in mine/ERW casualty numbers in 2018 "to 'new contamination' by anti-personnel weapons in the country, linked to intensifying conflict."¹²

States with the most recorded mine/ERW casualties in 2018

State	Casualties
Afghanistan	2,234
Syria	1,465
Yemen	596
Myanmar	430
Ukraine	325
Mali	303
Iraq	204
Colombia	171
Nigeria	147
Pakistan	122

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

⁷ In 2018, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and three other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

⁸ Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2018: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

⁹ The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, and global, dataset of casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2018 included datasets or reporting from the following types of sources: international organizations, conflict tracking databases, UN and national mine action centers, other UN agencies, humanitarian mine action operators, ICBL members, and other NGOs, as well as media scanning.

¹⁰ Additionally, in 2018 the Monitor again began including casualties among NSAG forces emplacing improvised mines. These had previously been excluded due to the likelihood that the emplaced explosive item causing the accidental explosion was a command-denotated IED. However, by 2018, there was less distinction between incidents of NSAGs as casualties of their own minefields or laying the improvised mines, and more indications that accidents involved laying trigger-sensitive improvised mines.

¹¹ Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2018. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

¹² "Rising landmine blast toll in Afghanistan highlights long-term care needs of survivors," *UN News*, 6 February 2019, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032141>.

The Monitor identified 1,465 mine/ERW casualties in Syria from multiple sources for 2018, which is a decrease from 1,906 in 2017.¹³ However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. Casualty totals have fluctuated in part due to inconsistent availability of data and sources. There are many people recorded as dead compared to those injured. Therefore, it is certain, based on the probable proportion of fatalities to people injured, that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria in 2018, as in past years, was substantially higher than the annual total recorded.¹⁴

The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the effective operation of a national casualty surveillance mechanism. Yemen reported that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) information management system has become outdated and is currently not usable. Furthermore, the conflict has presented new mines and mine-technologies (improvised mines), with which YEMAC has had no previous experience. This is compounded by the scale of the conflict and its extensive impact geographically in the country.¹⁵

The figures reported for mine/ERW casualties in Yemen differ widely, underlining the abovementioned challenge of collecting reliable data in a context of ongoing conflict. In both its Article 5 extension request and its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for 2018, Yemen informed States Parties of 1,087 casualties recorded in 2018 (967 men and 120 women), without noting the number of persons killed and injured or types of explosive items causing casualty incidents.¹⁶ The UN Humanitarian Response reporting observed that landmines caused the third most civilian casualties in 2018 in Yemen, despite a lower rate of incidents; reporting that 233 civilian casualties were the result of landmine incidents.¹⁷ Other UN reporting stated that mines/ERW caused 227 child casualties alone in Yemen in 2018.¹⁸ The Monitor total for 2018 is from multiple combined sources including other detailed data from YEMAC.

In Iraq, as in previous years, it is certain that there were many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred in 2018 that have not been identified. However, UN reporting indicates that there was a significant overall reduction in conflict-related casualties of all types, which may signal that the decrease in mine/ERW casualties since the reduction of recent conflict is part of a trend.¹⁹

Casualty data in Libya was not complete or comprehensive. It lacked key details, and data from 2018 was reportedly not yet entered into the national information management system.²⁰

New information on casualties in Nigeria from 2016 through 2019 was recorded by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which significantly heightened understanding and awareness of the extent of the impact of mines/ERW, especially improvised mines, in that State Party.

¹³ Not including the occupied Golan Heights.

¹⁴ The Monitor recorded 933 people killed and 532 people injured in Syria in 2018, whereas generally only just over a quarter of all mine/ERW casualties will be fatalities.

¹⁵ Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid.; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018).

¹⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Civilian Impact Monitoring Report: January–December 2018," p. 9, <http://bit.ly/369Zmaw>.

¹⁸ UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General, Protection of civilians in armed conflict," 7 May 2019, para. 31, <http://bit.ly/36be2Gs>; and UN, "Inter-agency messaging for the Vienna Conference on Protecting Civilians in Urban Warfare," 3 October 2019.

¹⁹ In December 2018, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that its "monitoring in recent months has shown a steady reduction in civilian casualties." UNAMI decided to stop releasing civilian casualty updates on a monthly basis, but rather based on the circumstances.

²⁰ Audrey Torrecilla, "Victim Assistance in Libya Position Paper," UNMAS Libya, September 2019, pp. 23–27, www.unmas.org/sites/default/files/va_report_libya_2019-libmac-unmas.pdf.

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS²¹

There were at least 1,714 child casualties in 2018, which accounted for 40% of all casualties for whom the age group was known (4,310), but made up over half (54%) of civilians for whom the age group was known (3,088).²² Children were killed (582) or injured (1,132) by mines/ERW in 38 states and other areas in 2018.²³ As in previous years, in 2018, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (84%).²⁴ ERW caused most child casualties (871, or 51%).

In 2018, men and boys made up the vast majority of all casualties, with 88% of all casualties for which the sex was known (4,162 of 4,709). Women and girls made up 12% of all casualties for which the sex was known (547).

Civilians represented 71% of casualties in 2018 where the civilian/military/deminer status was known (4,087 of 5,770); with 1,663 military casualties.²⁵ The country with the most recorded military casualties of mines/ERW in 2018 was Afghanistan (642); followed by Syria (269), both with state soldiers and NSAG combatant casualties (including militia) recorded; and Mali (153) with national and international military (including peacekeeper forces). The total military casualties for 2018 represented the second highest number recorded other than 2008 (1,694) in any year since 1999.

In 2018, the Monitor identified 20 casualties among deminers in seven countries (four deminers were killed and 16 injured).²⁶ Another 28 casualties (26 killed and two injured) were state military and NSAG personnel who were killed and injured while clearing, disarming, or dismantling mines in Syria. These were not included in the total of deminer casualties.²⁷

MINE/ERW TYPES RESULTING IN CASUALTIES

Monitor casualty records include only mine/ERW casualties; people killed or injured in incidents involving explosive items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.²⁸ Casualties from incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remotely detonated mines or IEDs—those that were not victim-activated—are not included. Mines/ERW therefore differs from the classification of explosive ordnance.²⁹ That is because the definition of explosive ordnance additionally includes devices that are

²¹ The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

²² Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident.

²³ In 2018, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and two other areas, Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh.

²⁴ There were 1,163 boys and 231 girls recorded as casualties in 2018; the sex of 320 child casualties was not recorded.

²⁵ In 2018, military casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.

²⁶ In 2018, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, China, Iran, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen.

²⁷ Also, a demining dog was killed in a mine explosion in Turkey.


²⁸ Such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs.) AXO and UXO are collectively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW casualties. Not included in the totals are estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given.

²⁹ International Mine Action Standards 04.10, "Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations" says 3.99. Explosive Ordnance (EO) (2018) "interpreted as encompassing mine action's response to the following munitions: Mines, Cluster Munitions, Unexploded Ordnance, Abandoned Ordnance, Booby traps, Other devices (as defined by CCW APII), Improvised Explosive Devices." Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II, Article 2 - Definitions: "Other devices" include "improvised explosive devices which are activated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time."

activated manually or by remote control.³⁰ In practical terms for casualties reporting in 2018, for example, some 427 casualties of landmines or IEDs in Yemen, which were not clearly victim-activated, were excluded from the global dataset, as were hundreds of casualties recorded in Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and other countries impacted by improvised mines and emplaced IEDs.

In 2018, landmines of all types caused at least 4,885 casualties—these were recorded as being caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (332), improvised mines (3,789), antivehicle mines (394), and other unspecified mine types (370).

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2018



As noted previously, improvised mines that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, fit the definition of antipersonnel mines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. Of the total 3,789 improvised mine casualties recorded for 2018, at least 1,752 (46%) were reported *specifically* to be “antipersonnel mines” of an improvised nature.³¹ Only 204 (5%) of the total improvised mine casualties for 2018 (those recorded for Mali), were believed to be certain to act as “antivehicle mines”. The rest were not recorded specifically as to the mine type as the exact nature of the trigger mechanisms of improvised mines is often not reported in many countries; however, available information indicates that the fusing of most improvised mines causing casualties worldwide allows them to be activated by a person, thus effectively making them prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. For example, in Colombia antipersonnel mines are all of an improvised nature and in Ukraine most improvised antipersonnel mines recorded were tripwire-fitted hand grenades. In June 2019, UNAMA stated that it “reiterates that victim-activated pressure plate IEDs [a common type of improvised mines in many countries] function like anti-personnel landmines, which are prohibited under the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines.”³²

³⁰ See the table in the Annex of this section.

³¹ The total of improvised antipersonnel mine casualties recorded in 2018 in Afghanistan (1,586), Colombia (150), and Ukraine (16).

³² UNAMA, “Midyear Update on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2019,” 30 July 2019, p. 6, <http://bit.ly/2BPTBRa>.

Casualties from improvised mines were identified in 18 states in 2018.³³ Most improvised mine casualties in 2018 occurred in Afghanistan (1,586) and Syria (1,076). Casualties recorded as caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (thus, not including improvised mines) were documented in 19 states and areas in 2018, four less than in 2017.³⁴

In 2018, antivehicle mines were recorded as having caused at least 394 casualties in 20 states and areas.³⁵ The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were Yemen (154) and Mali (98).³⁶ In both countries, factory-made antivehicle mines are also used in the construction of improvised mines, making it difficult to distinguish between these types from reporting, or disaggregate casualties by the explosive item responsible with a high level of certainty. Often, such modifications may make the mine effectively an antipersonnel device, because it can be triggered by a person. For example, it was claimed that Houthi (Ansar Allah) forces refitted antivehicle mines that originally required 100kgs of pressure to trigger a detonation, so that they could explode with a force of just 10kgs.³⁷ Such modification often involves the addition of mechanisms to detonate the mines such as pressure plates or tripwires, which also increase the area coverage as well as the sensitivity of fusing.

In Mali, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents recorded in 2018 and no casualties occurred while individuals were on foot, though 25 of the civilian casualties in Mali in 2018 occurred in 10 incidents where they were on an animal-drawn cart.

Another 370 casualties were recorded under the category of other unspecified mine types in 18 states and areas.³⁸

33 Not included among casualties recorded from factory-made antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or other unspecified types of mines. Casualties from improvised mines in 2018 occurred in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Additionally, improvised mine casualties were known to have occurred in Myanmar, but these are undifferentiated from other mine casualties in data. Among sources used by the Monitor for calendar year 2018 data on improvised mine casualties, data from among the casualties of explosive incidents categorized as "victim-activated" in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive violence data set for 2018 was included. AOAV casualty data for 2018, provided by email from Jennifer Dathan, Researcher, AOAV, 15 March 2019; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2018. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.

34 In 2018, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and other area Western Sahara.

35 In 2018, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

36 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Antivehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 569 casualties from both confirmed and suspected antivehicle mines in 2018. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 25 June 2019; and GICHD-SIPRI, "The humanitarian and developmental impact of antivehicle mines: Global mapping and analysis of anti-vehicle mine incidents in 2018," 2019, www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/avm-incident-report-2018.pdf. Monitor and GICHD-SIPRI methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in the differences in annual casualties reported. The research scope of the AVM project was broadened in 2018, in order to better record incidents caused by antivehicle mines of an improvised nature. However, in Monitor reporting when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle mines and improvised mines in different sources, the Monitor sometimes included those as improvised mine casualties. Monitor reporting does include politically disputed geographic "other areas" in reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible.

37 Project Masam: Saudi project for demining in Yemen, "Landmines are the gift of death to the Yemenis," undated, www.projectmasam.com/eng/landmines-are-the-gift-of-death-to-the-yemenis.

38 In 2018, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Niger, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and other area Western Sahara.

Unexploded submunitions caused 85 casualties.³⁹ Where the age group was known (59), child casualties made up more than half (39, or 66%) of all casualties caused by unexploded cluster submunitions.

Casualties caused by ERW numbered 1,410 in 32 states and areas in 2018.⁴⁰ Of the annual total, 632 ERW casualties occurred in Afghanistan. In 2018, globally, children made up 69% (871) of ERW casualties, when the age group was recorded.

In 2018, a total of 517 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were either not specifically identified initially, were otherwise undifferentiated or remained unknown during casualty recording (such as hospital records), or were not disaggregated when recorded in data systems.⁴¹

States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2018

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia, and Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola	Colombia	Afghanistan	Armenia	Algeria
Cameroon		Bangladesh	Azerbaijan	Egypt
Chad		Cambodia	Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Iran
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)		China	Tajikistan	Iraq
Ethiopia		India	Turkey	Israel
Kenya		Lao PDR	Ukraine	Kuwait
Mali		Myanmar	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Lebanon
Mauritania		Pakistan		Libya
Mozambique		Philippines		Morocco
Niger		Thailand		Palestine
Nigeria		Vietnam		Syria
Senegal				Tunisia
Somalia				Yemen
South Sudan				<i>Western Sahara</i>
Sudan				
Zimbabwe				
<i>Somaliland</i>				

Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in **bold**; other areas in *italics*.

³⁹ In 2018, unexploded submunition casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Nagorno Karabakh. One additional casualty for Iraq was identified after *Cluster Munition Monitor 2019* was published. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2018, see ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2019*.

⁴⁰ In 2018, ERW casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

⁴¹ Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

ANNEX

Mine/ERW types causing casualties


Category of mine/ ERW	Term	Description
Mines*	Antipersonnel mines	A munition designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.
	Antivehicle mines	Also referred to as “antitank mines,” and included among Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), these are designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person and tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuses that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person.
	Improvised mines	<p>Improvised mines are types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These are landmines and are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs).</p> <p>Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps (also included among “improvised mines”).**</p> <p>Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.</p>
	Other unspecified mine type	When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” incident, lacking other details regarding the mine type or its construction.

Category of mine/ERW	Term	Description
Unexploded cluster submunitions and bomblets	Unexploded submunition	Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and failed to explode or that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped.
Explosive remnants of war (ERW), including abandoned and unexploded command-detonated IEDs	ERW	Unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive weapons that have been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected yet remained unexploded. Abandoned ordnance (AXO): Explosive weapons that have not been used during an armed conflict, which have been left behind or dumped.
Explosive items, type unknown	Unknown mines/ERW item	Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items causing casualties that were detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle that were not attributed to a specific mines/ERW type either because it was not known what type of mine or ERW caused the casualty when information was recorded, or due to a lack of disaggregation between mines, explosives, and ERW causing casualties within a dataset, including when mines/ERW casualties are differentiated from other weapon victims.

*The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is "placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area" and an antipersonnel mine is a munition "designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person..." Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.

**In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised mines that caused casualties because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the sensitivity of fuzes after an explosion.

LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW), AND CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2018





HI partner with a prosthetic manufacturing workshop in Sanaa, Yemen
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VICTIM ASSISTANCE

This overview concerns the status of victim assistance, with a focus on 2018 and 2019 as relevant. It encompasses a summary of achievements attained as well as the challenges faced, by and in, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims in need of assistance.¹ In particular, it is an opportunity to weigh up the state of victim assistance in the context of the completion of the treaty's Maputo Action Plan (2014–2019), with a view to the implementation of the next five-year Oslo Action Plan, to be adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference in 2019.

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties committed to provide assistance for those people harmed by a specific type of weapon.² The ICBL pushed vigorously to have language related to assistance to mine victims included in the treaty's text. The preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties "to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims..." Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party "in a position to do so" to provide such assistance. Article 6 also affirms the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance to the extent possible for victims. Since the treaty's entry into force, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with limited resources.

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- 1 The Monitor reports on the following Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This list includes 30 States Parties that have indicated that they have significant numbers of victims for which they must provide care as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of victims in their official landmine clearance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. It also includes Palestine and Ukraine, as both are indicated to have significant numbers of victims and needs, but have not yet comprehensively reported them. See, Algeria, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2011, <http://bit.ly/2fzL7V7>; and Turkey, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, <http://bit.ly/2fzQCmu>.
 - 2 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.

While the term “landmine survivor” was widely used—including in Landmine Monitor reporting—at the time of the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004, the treaty text used the legal term “victim.” A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties in the Final Report formally adopted in Nairobi as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.”³ This widely accepted understanding of who is the focus of assistance also includes family members of casualties, both killed and injured, as well as affected communities.

Self-identification as a “victim” or as a “survivor” is an important element of the choice of use. “Whether someone sees themselves or someone else as a victim or as a survivor can greatly impact their overall sense of self, their quality of life and their reintegration into their community as a productive member of society.”⁴ There is also a concern in the disability rights community that use of the word “victim” can reopen the door to discriminatory and belittling approaches to persons with disabilities.

The Monitor has tracked progress in the services, programs, and activities that benefit victims under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans since 1999. Victim assistance aims to reduce the mortality rate of and improve the opportunities for recovery and rehabilitation of people injured by mines/ERW, achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of victims and the full inclusion of victims in wider society, as well as ensuring that the same assistance is available to affected communities.

That assistance includes, but is not limited to, the following components and practices (also referred to as pillars): data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological and psychosocial support; social and economic inclusion; and the adoption or adjustment of relevant laws and public policies. Preferably, such assistance is to be provided through a holistic and comprehensive approach comprised of all of the above elements. In addition, though less information is available, some victim assistance efforts are reported that reach family members and other people who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to mines/ERW.

It is evident that tens of thousands of mine/ERW victims, persons with disabilities, and other people with similar needs have benefited from the increased attention given to the issue of victim assistance by States Parties and the international community since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. Numerous programs and projects to enhance the availability, accessibility, and adequacy of healthcare, physical rehabilitation, and social and economic inclusion have been implemented.

Despite ongoing financial shortages that evidently reduced the availability of some services in recent years, victim assistance efforts have remained, to a large degree, robust, and donors and providers have maintained their determination to increase achievements and improve the survival rate of people injured and the quality of life of survivor and indirect victims. For over two decades, the many improved methods and successful activities undertaken, as recorded by the Monitor, have shown that delivering victim assistance is not inherently complicated.

Although many challenges remain in creating access to suitable and enduring services and in covering all pillars of holistic and integrated assistance, Monitor research demonstrates that there is a much better understanding of the needs in affected countries.

Yet, it is also well recognized that many victims have not had access to emergency medical services, comprehensive rehabilitation, or the opportunity to participate in society on an equal basis with others. Some have never had access to facilities and services. Many local

³ See, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,” APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, para. 64; and “Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.icbl.org/media/933290/Nairobi-Action-Plan-2005.pdf.

⁴ Melanie Reimer and Teresa Broers, “Landmine Victim or Landmine Survivor: What Is in a Name?” *The Journal of ERW and Mine Action* 15 (2), 2011, www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/15.2/focus/reimer/reimer.shtml.

and international NGOs have reported decreased funding and resources for most countries and programs in recent years, especially those not in emergency settings. The decline in finances and supplies is limiting existing operations and threatening the sustainability of essential programs. It also reveals that existing services are far from meeting the needs of victims and the disparities are yet to be covered by other frameworks.

The Mine Ban Treaty's action plans support victim assistance by building on States Parties' commitments to: save lives; enhance health services; increase physical rehabilitation; develop psychosocial support capacities; actively support socio-economic inclusion; develop and implement relevant policy frameworks; give consideration to cross-cutting factors, including gender, age, and disability; enhance data collection; involve mine victims in the work of the treaty; and ensure the meaningful participation of victims and other relevant experts at international meetings.

In June 2004 at the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi, an initial group of 24 States Parties⁵ "themselves have indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors" and that they had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance. All States Parties committed to the Maputo Action Plan, which included a set of actions that would advance victim assistance through 2019.⁶

Progress during the Nairobi Action Plan (2004–2009) period was most evident in the improved process and planning of assistance, well above that made in the increased availability and implementation of health, rehabilitation, economic, or psychological services. Those States Parties that had made significant advances on their self-defined objectives realized achievements related to data collection, coordination, strategies, and awareness-raising.

At the beginning of the Cartagena Action Plan period (2009–2014), service provision remained inadequate and had not increased significantly nor had life conditions of most survivors, though data indicates that the survival rate of people injured improved in that time. Thus, many victims received some form of assistance through the years, while facing too many gaps in services and implementation of assistance that was largely unsystematic and unsustainable. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, often supported by international organizations and funding. Furthermore, the steps actually made in increasing programs and activities that directly benefited victims, while beneficial, were often unrelated to the specific objectives of the strategies that those countries had developed for themselves in order to fulfill the commitments of the Nairobi Action Plan.

THE ROADMAP FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE 2014–2019: THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN

At the start of the Maputo Action Plan period, approximately two-thirds of States Parties had active coordination mechanisms and relevant national plans in place.

In most of these countries, victim assistance efforts have collaborative coordination, combined planning, and/or victim participation. Victims participated in decisions that affect their lives and in the implementation of services in nearly all the relevant States Parties. Yet, in many countries, victim participation required additional support, especially for victims to be effectively included in coordination roles.

The Maputo Action Plan highlights the continued relevance of the actions of the Cartagena Action Plan, issues a strong call for effective victim participation, and underscores the importance of integrating victim assistance into other frameworks. The plan's seven victim

5 UN, "Final Report, First Review Conference," Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, PLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 33. Of these countries, 23 reported responsibility at the First Review Conference in Nairobi from 29 November to 3 December 2004, and with Ethiopia's ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty on 17 December 2004, the number increased to 24.

6 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, <http://bit.ly/2e2R10L>.

assistance-related action points set an agreed path for States Parties to continue working to address the needs of victims with targeted and mainstream actions across a range of ministries and stakeholders and to raise the issue of mine victims in “international, regional and national human rights, healthcare, labour and other fora, instruments and domains” while continuing to report “measurable achievements” in victim assistance at international meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Relevant action points of the Maputo Action Plan may be summarized as follows:

- Assess the needs of mine victims. Assess the availability and gaps in services. Support efforts to refer victims to existing services
- Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives
- Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks
- Strengthen local capacities, enhance coordination, and increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures
- Enhance the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them
- Raise awareness of the imperative to address the needs and to guarantee the rights of mine victims
- Report on measurable improvements

The Maputo Action Plan called on States Parties to undertake actions to address victim assistance “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”

The Committee on Victim Assistance replaced the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration and was given a new mandate, for the first time specifically directing the committee to take the discussion of the needs and rights of victims to other relevant forums, while continuing to provide advice for States Parties efforts to advance in their victim assistance commitments.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE, DISABILITY RIGHTS, AND OTHER FRAMEWORKS

Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW in 2008, and most recently included in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

At the Mine Ban Treaty First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in 1999, the international mine action community first articulated the notion that victim assistance was to be a part of broader contexts, including human rights approaches.⁷ Subsequently, in the Mine Ban Treaty’s first Action Plan adopted in 2004, States Parties committed to ensuring that they effectively address the “fundamental human rights of mine victims” through national legal and policy frameworks.⁸

The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is legally binding, providing an overarching mechanism for the amendment of national laws and policies related to persons with disabilities. The CRPD does not provide for new rights but it frames the existing rights catalog in an accessible way. The CRPD pertains also to victims of indiscriminate weapons. Although not all injuries result in long-term physical impairment, the impact of indiscriminate weapons frequently results in landmine and ERW survivors becoming persons with disabilities and therefore protected by the CRPD.

⁷ “MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” 27 June 2014, <http://bit.ly/32RrJbu>.

⁸ Nairobi Action Plan, 2004–2009, Action #33.

Similarly, over time it has become more widely recognized that, just as efforts to respond to the needs of victims should benefit all persons with similar needs, including other persons with disabilities, without discrimination, so should the rights of victims be considered by disability rights actors. This interconnectivity allows for solution-oriented approaches to implementing international legal commitments and legal obligations that arise from the CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Mine Ban Treaty.



Dr. Tom Shakespeare of the World Health Organization (WHO) meets ICBL Ambassador Song Kosal who is quoted in the World Report on Disability.

©MBT ISU, 2011

Global conferences, symposia, and regional meetings raised awareness of good practices and concrete actions, services, and policies that can, in coordination with others, positively alter the lives of victims. Chief among those were the “Bridges between Worlds” meetings in 2014, which included a main global conference held in Colombia that discussed assistance to victims of mines/ERW in broader contexts of disarmament, human rights, and development efforts, particularly disability rights.⁹ In September 2019, a three-day Global Conference on Assistance to Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Explosive Remnants of War and Disability Rights, chaired by Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Husein of Jordan took place in Amman.¹⁰

In 2009, national survivor networks previously existing as country programs of the United States-based NGO Survivor Corps (or Landmine Survivors Network, LSN) transitioned to become nationally registered organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, among

others. Subsequently, from 2012–2015, the ICBL-CMC’s Survivor Networks Project, supported by Norway, provided resources to campaign member networks (including former LSN country branches) and trained representatives of survivor networks and disabled person’s organizations (DPOs) on monitoring the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CRPD as a means to promote the rights of victims and persons with disabilities. Victim assistance NGOs, survivor networks, and DPOs in many countries made efforts to collaborate with each other and with development and rights actors to promote the inclusion of mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities in mainstream programs and in policy-making bodies at national and local levels.

Since the adoption of the Maputo Action Plan, substantial progress was also made by civil society organizations forging links across sectors and regions to advance the rights of mine/ERW victims and other persons with similar needs. In 2014, for example, Humanity & Inclusion (then-Handicap International), in collaboration with the ICBL-CMC, convened a Latin American seminar in Colombia on psychosocial assistance for victims of armed conflict, including mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities. This became an annual event, bringing together representatives of networks of mine/ERW victims, networks of armed conflict survivors, DPOs, and service providers. The fifth Latin American Regional Seminar for Strengthening the Network of Landmine and ERW Survivors and Persons with Disabilities, hosted by Humanity & Inclusion with ICBL-CMC participation, was held in Bogota in August 2019, in the lead up to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference. Topics included strengthening assistance networks, accessing rights, and monitoring human rights.

In September 2015, UN Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are designed to address

⁹ “Bridges” meetings were also held in Geneva and forged additional relationships among individuals working primarily on disability, development, or assistance to victims from a humanitarian perspective.

¹⁰ Also sponsored by a Decision adopted by the European Union Council to support implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. Therefore, the SDGs are generally complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the CRPD, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer exceptional opportunities for bridging the relevant frameworks.

More specifically, persons with disabilities are referred to directly in several of the SDGs that are highly relevant to the implementation of the CRPD and the humanitarian disarmament conventions' action plans: education (SDG 4), employment (SDG 8), reducing inequality (SDG 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (SDG 17).

Mine Ban Treaty victim assistance continues to be an essential commitment for victims especially in conflict-affected, post-conflict, and fragile states. These same states have limited capacity, as reflected in the lack of regular reporting to the Mine Ban Treaty, that would help the international community determine how best to earmark assistance. In many of these states, the provision of victim assistance can both benefit from, and contribute to, the implementation of the SDGs. Victim assistance supports the needs of many other people affected by conflict, particularly those impacted by other types of explosive weapons. It is clear that a significant commitment to sustained international cooperation is needed to assist states in meeting their victim assistance obligations.

Those states with existing capacity and services tend to get the most attention and are also most often used as examples of good practices. Yet, many of these states face circumstances that limit their opportunities to report on the progress that they have made, hindering their ability to identify needs and to request appropriate assistance. With support, states facing such challenges can make greater progress, but not if they are overlooked and their challenges remain unheard.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN¹¹

The draft Oslo Action Plan confirms the States Parties' continuing commitment to "ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination." It also reaffirms States Parties understanding that "victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, and to health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction in support of the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals."¹²

Proposed victim assistance-relevant actions include activities to implement the following:

- Ensure the meaningful participation of mine victims in all related matters and meetings¹³
- A government entity for coordination¹⁴
- Inter-governmental planning, national policies, and legal frameworks¹⁵
- A centralized database on victims' needs and challenges¹⁶

¹¹ For more information on implementing victim assistance pillars through an action plan see, "Assisting the Victims: Recommendations on Implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014," presented to the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration Belgium and Thailand, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 30 November 2009.

¹² Norway, "Draft Oslo Action Plan: Submitted by the President of the Fourth Review Conference," 27 September 2019, <http://bit.ly/344oc9P>.

¹³ See, Draft Oslo Action Plan, Action #4.

¹⁴ Ibid., Action #32.

¹⁵ Ibid., Action #33.

¹⁶ Ibid., Action #34.

- Timely first aid response and pre-hospital care¹⁷
- A national referral mechanism and directory of services¹⁸
- Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services, and psychological and psychosocial support services¹⁹
- Social and economic inclusion²⁰
- Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters²¹

PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS²²

Victims were reported to be included through representation in coordination in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. As yet, States Parties have rarely reported on the outcomes of victim participation and how their input is considered or acted upon. In some states, victims' representative organizations and other service providers involved in coordination and planning reported that the concerns and contributions of victims were not genuinely taken into account, despite their attendance at relevant meetings.

RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO COORDINATE VICTIM ASSISTANCE²³

Of the 33 States Parties, 21 had active victim assistance coordination linked with disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs of mine/ERW victims. The states with coordination mechanisms in 2018–2019 were: Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angola's coordination mechanism is not interconnected with disability rights coordination.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING, NATIONAL POLICIES, AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS²⁴

Adopting and implementing a comprehensive inter-ministerial plan of action that identifies gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims and, or among, other persons with disabilities is a key step to ensuring a coordinated response to the needs.

Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand have a current plan that addresses national victim assistance activities and Zimbabwe has a set of measurable objectives.

Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen need to revise, finalize, or adopt a draft and implement their national disability plan, policy, or strategy that includes objectives that respond to the needs of victims and recognizes its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring structure. Mozambique still has to implement the Action Plan for Assistance to Victims through relevant government departments and ministries.

¹⁷ Ibid., Action #35.

¹⁸ Ibid., Action #36.

¹⁹ Ibid., Action #39.

²⁰ Ibid., Action #40.

²¹ Ibid., Action #41.

²² Ibid., Action #42; CRPD Article 1 – Purpose – Article 29 – Participation in political and public life.

²³ Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #32; CRPD Article 33 – National implementation and monitoring.

²⁴ Draft Oslo Action Plan, Action #33; CRPD Article 33 – National implementation and monitoring.

States Parties that need to develop a plan or strategy include DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey. In the meantime, DRC requires a sustainable planning and coordination mechanism working at national and local levels to increase efforts to implement the victim assistance objectives of its national mine action strategy. Turkey, which now has coordination, must develop a plan for implementation of victim assistance. Newer States Parties, Palestine, and Sri Lanka are yet to create a strategic framework for victim assistance.

CENTRALIZED DATABASE WITH NEEDS AND CHALLENGES²⁵

States Parties commit to assess the needs of victims. This commitment includes assessing the availability and gaps in services and support, as well as existing or new requirement activities needed to meet the needs of victims in the frameworks of disability, health, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. Assessment also provides an initial opportunity to refer victims to existing services.

Few structured national needs assessment surveys were conducted since 2015. Mine Action Centers and service providers often collected information on victims in an ongoing manner in conjunction with other victim assistance and program activities.

Some notable survey activities and assessments of needs of survivors since 2015 included the following:

Afghanistan's National Disability Database, initiated in 2017, was under development and planned to be installed by the end of 2019. Statistics on persons with disabilities and the families of those killed could be used to coordinate with the ministry of finance, pension department, and population registration department to provide the necessary services. In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and medical needs of marginalized ERW victims carried out during 2013–2016 was completed. In Cambodia, village-level quality of life assessments for victims and other persons with disabilities continued into 2019. Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing in Colombia and new data management systems were used during the period.

Croatia made early progress in the development of a unified database on the needs of mine/ERW victims, specifically including families, which stalled from 2017 onward. In Serbia, the ministry responsible for victim assistance worked with other government institutions to improve coordination on data and needs assessment. In Tajikistan, the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) carried out needs assessment from which information was entered into the national database to be shared with relevant stakeholders. Thailand reported that data collection on mine/ERW victims was relatively advanced and that survivors are included in disability assessments. In Yemen, more mine/ERW victims were registered with the mine action center through ongoing survey conducted jointly with the national survivor association until increased conflict disrupted regular assessment and data collection.

Algeria needed to ensure that all victims are registered and therefore able to receive pensions and other benefits and to develop a central data collection mechanism on victims needs to improve planning of victim assistance. BiH needed to review its existing data and speed up the establishment of a mine/ERW victims database in Republika Srpska. Burundi needed to develop a national database on victims and needs. Chad has yet to improve and systematize casualty data collection. Croatia needed to complete the national victim survey and unified victim database in process since 2015. Eritrea needed to develop a mechanism to document, record, and share information on mine/ERW accidents. Iraq needed to establish a unified and coordinated system of data collection and analysis for survivors and other persons with disabilities. Mine action actors in Somalia were alerted to the need for

²⁵ Draft Oslo Action Plan, Action #34; CRPD Article 31 – Statistics and data collection.

collecting appropriate data from a situation assessment of the victim assistance sector. And Yemen needed to improve the collection of data and create a usable database of victims' needs.

Disability survey, including through national census questions, was proposed in many national and international contexts. CRPD Article 31 calls on States Parties to collect information, including statistical and research data, and to disaggregate this information to identify barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising their rights. Action #35 of the draft Oslo Action Plan includes each relevant state having a centralized database that includes information on mine victims and needs and challenges, disaggregated by gender, age, and disability.

TIMELY FIRST AID RESPONSE FOR CASUALTIES AND ADEQUATE PRE-HOSPITAL TRAUMA CARE²⁶

Time-sensitive emergency care includes interventions such as first aid and field trauma response, emergency evacuation, availability of transport, and immediate medical care that involves assessment and prehospital communication of critical information for patient handover. The provision of appropriate emergency medical services can considerably affect the chance of the survival and the speed of recovery of mine victims, as well as outcomes of injuries and the severity of impairments.

Improvements in medical care services to strengthen emergency response capacities for people injured by mines/ERW and others in affected communities were reported in Afghanistan and Croatia.

In Guinea-Bissau, only the hospital in the capital city can treat serious injuries. There is a drastic problem of accessibility of immediate healthcare across the DRC where, in most cases, people injured cannot receive appropriate assistance, resulting in death. In South Sudan, incidents often occurred in remote areas far from access to health services.

International organizations continued to provide much needed assistance in conflict-affected areas. Healthcare services for all persons with disabilities in Iraq decreased over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, healthcare deteriorated, many medical facilities were damaged, and ongoing conflict further undermined the struggling health system. In Ukraine, along the line of contact, primary-healthcare centers and satellite services received required equipment and medicines.

NATIONAL REFERRAL MECHANISMS²⁷

States Parties can improve accessibility of services by ensuring that existing data collection, needs assessment, and service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Similarly, taking a holistic approach to assistance, health, and rehabilitation service providers can provide referrals to others who can support the inclusion of victims. Referral mechanisms can involve at the national level mechanisms as well as local community referrals network, including through community-based rehabilitation systems.

Since 2015, national governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both mine action centers and government ministries, such as: Algeria's Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola's Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority's data department CMVIS; the Colombian Department for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (DAICMA) and the broader government run reparations program at the Victim's Unit; the

²⁶ Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #35; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal mobility; CRPD Article 26 – Habilitation and rehabilitation.

²⁷ Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #36; Article 4 – General obligations.

Rehabilitation and Integration Division within Eritrea's Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare; Iraq's Directorate for Mine Action; the Tajikistan Mine Action Center; and the Yemen Mine Action Center.

However, many more non-governmental groups and organizations provided referrals at a national or local level in the States Parties with victims, including a range of survivor networks, national NGOs and DPOs, and international NGOs, notably Humanity & Inclusion, as well as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.

REHABILITATION, HEALTHCARE, PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT²⁸

In many countries, including Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, and Somalia, a lack of available and accessible medical care may have a significant impact on the quality of life of victims. Many affected countries continue to report inadequate numbers of trained staff, health services, and other treatments such as pain management in remote, rural, and other mine-affected areas.

Several countries saw improved healthcare infrastructure in affected areas ensuring that facilities have adequate equipment, supplies, and medicines necessary to meet basic standards.

Rehabilitation including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs help the person regain or improve mobility and to engage in everyday activities. Psychosocial support is often an integral aspect of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation services with a comprehensive or multidisciplinary approach involve a team that includes a medical doctor, physiotherapist, prosthetist, and social worker as well as other specialists as needed. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Article 12.1. recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Article 15.1.(b) of that convention recognizes the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. This can also apply to prosthetic and assistive devices.

States can increase the sustainability of rehabilitation by allocating a specific budget line for physical and functional rehabilitation needs of all persons with disabilities including victims. In Algeria, victims and persons with disabilities continued to have access to most prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. Additional rehabilitation facilities were built in Iraq in 2018–2019, including a much-needed new center in Mosul, but the entire rehabilitation system lacked capacity to deliver enough services and devices to meet the increased needs.

In Afghanistan, authorities have acknowledged that it would be unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces of Afghanistan, however at least seven more centers were still needed. A record number of Afghan citizens with disabilities sought rehabilitation services in 2018. Afghanistan reported that 90% of the population lives more than 100km away from a rehabilitation center and 20 of the 34 provinces do not have a prosthetics center. Access to rehabilitation centers is also extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda.

In Cambodia, slow progress was made in the handover of rehabilitation centers to government management while securing resources for their sustainability. In BiH and Serbia, where orthopedics are state regulated, excessive and unnecessary bureaucratic procedures limited access to devices. Iraq developed a multi-sector rehabilitation strategy and Palestine adopted an emergency rehabilitation plan.

²⁸ Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #39; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal mobility; CRPD Article 26 – Habilitation and rehabilitation.

Survivors networks

States/areas	Examples of survivor networks
Afghanistan	Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO)
Albania	Albanian Assistance for Integration and Development (ALB-AID) Survivor Network
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzBL) Survivor Network
BiH	Organization of Amputees Republika Srpska (UDAS)
Cambodia	Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions (CamC-BLCM) Survivor Network; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Cambodia
Colombia	District Association of Landmine Survivors (ADISMAM); the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM)
DRC	National Association of Mine Survivors and Victims Advocacy (ANAS-DIV)
El Salvador	Foundation Network of Survivors and Person with Disabilities
Ethiopia	Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO)
Mozambique	Network for Mine Victims (RAVIM)
Nepal	Nepalese Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) Survivor Network
Senegal	Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (ISAD)
Serbia	Assistance, Advocacy, Access Serbia (AAAS)
Tajikistan	Tajikistan Survivor Network
Vietnam	Association for Empowerment of Person of Persons with Disabilities (AEPD)
Uganda	Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA)
<i>Western Sahara</i>	Sahrawi Association of Mine Victims (ASAVIM)
Yemen	Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS)

Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

A much-needed new rehabilitation center was launched in Mosul, Iraq in 2018, however the entire rehabilitation sector required increased resources and capacity. In Palestine, the main prosthetic center in Gaza faced significant strain on its limited resources while addressing an increase in patients with amputations among protesters who had been shot in the legs. In part to meet this demand, a new prosthetic hospital and disability rehabilitation center was opened in 2019. Accessing materials and financial resources were an obstacle to rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, where most prostheses were available through charities. In Yemen, increased support to the physical rehabilitation sector was reported in response to the needs caused by ongoing conflict, but availability of assistance overall remained far from adequate for meeting those needs.

Outreach programs including mobile clinics improved access to physical rehabilitation services in affected communities, often offering both repair and replacement of devices. Access to physiotherapy care was extended through home visits in El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the health ministry hired additional technicians for satellite centers and the national rehabilitation center. Since 2015, mine/ERW victims from Senegal have been receiving prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an agreement between the ICRC, the Senegalese Survivor Network, and the mine action center.

Despite this being the pillar of victim assistance that has seen the greatest focus, many outstanding essential activities remained to be fulfilled for States Parties in the field of rehabilitation, for example: in Afghanistan there was a need to expand access to physical rehabilitation needs, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to

receive rehabilitation is difficult for victims; in Albania to develop existing capacities and management of the prosthetic center in Tirana and increase financial resources; in Angola to adequately support the prosthetic and orthopedic centers, including provision of materials; in BiH to improve the quality and sustainability of services, including by upgrading community-based rehabilitation centers; and in Burundi to improve access to physical rehabilitation for victims by eliminating fees for services.

It remained necessary for Cambodia to improve sustainability of the entire physical rehabilitation sector; for Chad to increase investment in physical rehabilitation services; for DRC to improve the availability of physical rehabilitation and psychosocial services significantly throughout the country; for Eritrea to mobilize resources to expand the community-based rehabilitation program; for Ethiopia to establish a national supply chain of rehabilitation materials; for Turkey to make adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities a priority in the mine-affected regions; for Sri Lanka to coordinate rehabilitation and insure adequate supplies; and for Uganda to improve the sustainability, quality, and availability of prosthesis and rehabilitation services, including by enhancing coordination and dedicating the necessary national resources to what is currently considered a non-funded priority.

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based peer-support groups, networks of survivors and associations of persons with disabilities, as well as some types of sports and recreation activities.

In BiH, there was a program to develop structured peer-to-peer psychological support, by victims for victims, in healthcare and rehabilitation facilities, however such initiatives remained rare. In Senegal, victims supported other victims who received assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Survivor networks, which often provide peer-to-peer and collective psychosocial support, struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available. Mine/ERW victims in Kinshasa hold monthly peer-support meetings.

Many countries had improved sport and recreational activities for persons with disabilities, including families, such as wheelchair sports. However, access to cultural activities for victims and persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others was often lacking.

The following are some of the needs for psychological and psychosocial support identified: in Afghanistan, to provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support, in particular to new victims as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation; in Cambodia to improve the quality and availability psychological support services; in Colombia to include peer support services under the health insurance system; in DRC to improve the availability of psychosocial services significantly, especially outside the capital; in Mozambique to prioritize assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs; in Nicaragua to dedicate resources to implementation of psychosocial support programs; and in Senegal to ensure the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION²⁹

Most frequently NGOs or charity institutions implemented socio-economic inclusion projects for victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit, income generation, and employment. However, there are exceptions, in Serbia, for example, the priority of the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs was the social inclusion of veterans, veterans with disabilities, civilian invalids of war, and families of military war casualties. Thus, the state supported the development of veteran and disability protection services, social protection services, and employment in remote and rural areas.

Action #39 of the draft Oslo Action Plan includes “efforts to ensure the social and economic inclusion of mine victims” through access to education and capacity-building.

²⁹ Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #40; CRPD Article 27 – Work and employment; CRPD Article 28 – Adequate standard of living and social protection; CRPD Article 24 – Education.

Economic inclusion was a reported priority need in all states, and particularly in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda where employment, work training, livelihood incentives, and other economic opportunities continued to be areas with the greatest need for improvement for victims. There was a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities and develop education and training that are appropriate for victims and persons with disabilities who lack education and literacy and have no work or land from which to make a living.

A lack of awareness of disability rights and inclusion principles among teachers and fellow pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and prevent child victims from participating fully in educational activities. For example, it was reported that in Somalia the majority of children with disabilities were not accepted as pupils at school.

National programs to promote inclusive education at all levels, as part of the national education plans, policies and programs can contribute to the inclusion of child survivors and indirect child victims. In Afghanistan, an inclusive education policy was drafted, translated into national languages, and shared with the Ministry of Education for review and approval by its scientific and academic council. However, government-run national inclusive education program that increased the enrollment of children with disabilities in the country since 2008 lost core international funding from victim assistance sources in 2016, but through 2018 was implemented in part by NGO stakeholders. In DRC, one NGO conducted local inclusive education awareness-raising activities. But for another that also has remedial teaching schools in the east of the country for children of mine casualties, funding was insufficient for the school year in 2018–2019.

Gender-sensitive, age-appropriate, and disability-inclusive victim assistance

Action #39 of the Draft Oslo Action Plan calls for the “removal of physical, social, cultural, political, attitudinal and communication barriers in a gender-sensitive, age-appropriate and disability inclusive manner.”

Children, especially boys, are one of the largest groups of survivors. Since child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of support, age- and disability-appropriate assistance is required.³⁰

Following are some examples of related activities and challenges.

In Yemen, where the UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported that women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities are at greater risk of losing access to health services. UNICEF expanded its victim assistance services to children amputees in 2018 through support to two prosthesis and rehabilitation centers in Aden and Taizz governorates that provided the children with prosthesis and artificial limbs. Most of the children were mines/ERW survivors.

In BiH, survivors received support in setting up income-generating activities, including children and widows of people killed by mines/ERW.

In Afghanistan, the inclusive and child-friendly education coordination meetings focused on inclusion of the children who do not have access to education, in particular, children with disabilities. The action plan of the Technical Subcommittee of Assistance to Victims in Colombia included identification of child and adolescent survivors in order to provide opportunities for inclusive education within the framework of a 2017 decree, which regulates inclusive education for all persons with disabilities.

³⁰ For more information about the impact of mines/ERW on children and the wider impact of armed conflict on children, see Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “Landmines, Cluster Munitions and Unexploded Ordnances,” undated, childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/landmines-cluster-munitions-and-unexploded-ordnances/; “Focus: Explosive remnants of war,” Victim Assistance Editorial Team at the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, quoted in UNICEF, “The State of the World’s Children 2013: Children with disabilities,” 30 May 2013, www.unicef.org/sowc2013/focus_war_remnants.html; and “Strengthening the Assistance to Child Victims,” submitted by Austria and Colombia, Maputo Review Conference Documents, undated, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Austria-Colombia-Paper.pdf.

In Guinea-Bissau, the ICRC funded education for children with disabilities and installed ramps in front of school. In Turkey, it was reported that a large number of school-age children with disabilities did not receive adequate access to education. In Iraq, many children with disabilities dropped out of public school due to insufficient physical access to school buildings. Issues preventing children with disabilities attending school include a lack of transport, a lack of assistive devices, physical barriers, teachers without appropriate training, and the need for children to help with housework.

In Mozambique, UNICEF and Humanity & Inclusion together reach children with disabilities with Information, Orientation, and Social Support Service mobile teams, which identify children with disabilities and provide services, including assistive devices and physical modifications to enable school attendance. In Zimbabwe, men, women, and children have received prosthetics from the collaboration between a prosthetics center and mine action operators HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid, despite there being no specific programs or activities targeting women or children survivors.

While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women, and girls are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents. They often suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. Gender is a key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries. In 2018, the Gender and Mine Action Programme published an Operational Guidance paper on victim assistance responsive to gender and other diversity aspects with examples of good practices.³¹ The ICBL-CMC and Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Gender Focal Point participated in the launch.

PROTECTION OF MINE VICTIMS AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN SITUATIONS OF RISK, INCLUDING SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT, HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES, AND NATURAL DISASTERS³²

Generally, in conflict situations, civilians remain extremely vulnerable and under-protected. The UN Secretary-General found in 2019, "It is the cause of considerable concern, then, that the state of the protection of civilians today is tragically similar to that of 20 years ago."³³ Moreover, during times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing adequate and appropriate services. This five-year period of the Maputo Action Plan was marked by increased conflict, state fragility, and growing numbers of refugees and displaced persons resulting from conflict, as well as by the impact of conflict and natural disasters gravely affecting victim assistance efforts in a number of States Parties.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims of these weapons, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance with relevant human rights law. Those which are States Parties to the CRPD also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

³¹ See, GMAP, "Victim assistance responsive to gender and other diversity aspects," Geneva 2018, www.gmap.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/gmap_guidances_EN-web.pdf.

³² Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #41; CRPD Article 11 – Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies.

³³ UN Security Council, "Protection of civilians in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General," S/2019/373, 7 May 2019, para. 4.

In 2018–2019, several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with mine/ERW victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.

An even greater number of the relevant States Parties—Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe—have a Humanitarian Response Plan to address a humanitarian crisis, a protracted or sudden onset emergency that requires the support of more than one UN agency for international humanitarian assistance.

During the Maputo Action Plan period it was recognized that much remains to be done to link response approaches to disaster and conflict to ensure respect for the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW victims.

The 15-year Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 adopted in March 2015 contains several references to persons with disabilities in emergency situations, due to active advocacy by disability rights groups. However, the final document omitted references to armed conflict due to sensitivities about the use of the term. Yet, armed conflict and attacks on healthcare providers were increasingly concerning and impacted the availability of services in affected countries.³⁴

The charter on the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016. To date, only three of at least 12 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that have situations of armed conflict have signed the charter. Those three countries are Afghanistan, Colombia, and Thailand.

An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt implementation guidelines by the end of 2018, that was later extended to the end of 2019. In June 2019, the Security Council adopted its first text on the protection of persons with disabilities in conflict, Resolution 2475.³⁵

Armed violence and conflict also directly impact victim assistance efforts. For example, in Afghanistan on 25 December 2018, militants from an unidentified non-state armed group attacked and entered the building of the newly established State Ministry for Martyrs and Disabled Affairs, resulting in more than 40 people killed and others taken hostage. The CRPD Committee Experts reviewing Iraq’s reporting in September 2019 found that the challenges and consequences of “18 years of war, armed conflict and terrorism...had ravaged Iraq and... had had a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.”³⁶ The conflict in Syria caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons who have fled Syria.

Natural disasters during the period were also devastating. In 2019, floods in Mozambique severely affected persons with disabilities in remote and rural areas. In 2015, flash rains and massive floods destroyed houses and infrastructure in the Sahrawi refugee camps situated near Tindouf in Algeria, near Western Sahara where hundreds of victims live with little outside support. An earthquake in Nepal saw the national survivor network redirect resources to assisting persons with disabilities in recovering from the destruction.

³⁴ See, Health Care in Danger website at healthcareindanger.org. See also, Safeguarding Health in Conflict website at www.safeguardinghealth.org/.

³⁵ UN, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2475 (2019), Ground-Breaking Text on Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict,” 20 June 2019, www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13851.doc.htm.

³⁶ OHCHR, “Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities discusses the impact of the armed conflict on persons with disabilities in Iraq,” 11 September 2019, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24976&LangID=E.



Deminer Zeinab Hashem in southern Lebanon.

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SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action provided for calendar year 2018 by affected countries and international donors. Cooperation and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.

2018 FIGURES AND TRENDS

Total Support to Mine Action—Thirty-three donors and eight affected states reported contributing US\$699.5 million in international and national support for mine action in 2018¹; this is \$95.1 million less than the revised 2017 amount (a 12% decrease).

International contributions accounted for 92% of overall support for mine action in 2018, while states' contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the remaining 8% of global funding.

International Contributions—After two years of sustained growth in 2016 and 2017, the level of international support for mine action provided by donors declined from \$696.3 million in 2017 to \$642.6 million in 2018 (an 8% decrease). This represents the second-highest level of international support recorded by the Monitor.²

- The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway,

¹ This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2018, as of October 2019. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current US dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The total amount of international support in 2017 was updated to include revised contributions from France and the United States (US).

² The Monitor maintains records of international support to mine action back to 1996, and national support back to 2002.

and Germany—contributing a total of \$458.1 million, or 71% of all international funding for 2018.

- The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia and Lao PDR—received a combined total of \$351.2 million, representing 55% of all international contributions.
- International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (62% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), capacity-building (2%), and advocacy (1%). The remaining 28% was not disaggregated by the donors.

National Contributions—The Monitor identified eight affected states that provided \$56.9 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, down \$41.4 million (a 42% decrease) from 2017 when 10 affected countries reported contributing \$98.3 million.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2018

In 2018, donors contributed more than \$642 million in international support for mine action—a decrease of \$53.7 million (8%) from the \$696.3 million reported in 2017. While this halts the two-year in a row growth seen in 2016 and 2017, it is the second-highest level of funding ever recorded in Monitor data, going back to 1996.³

International support for mine action: 2008–2018*



Note: * Not adjusted for inflation.

DONORS IN 2018

In 2018, 26 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, three states not party, the EU, and three other institutions⁴ contributed a total of \$642.6 million to mine action.

A small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support with the five largest donors (the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany) accounting

³ Data for 2018 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2018, UNMAS Annual Report 2018, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Ten of the 26 States Parties documented in this chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2018, compared to 13 out of 28 States Parties in 2017.

⁴ China, South Korea, and the US are the three states not party. The three institutions are the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

for nearly three-quarters (71%) of all international support with a combined total of \$458.1 million. The US remained the largest mine action donor with \$201.7 million and it alone provided nearly a third (31%) of all international mine action support in 2018. The EU ranked second with \$108.1 million, or 17% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the UK, Norway, and Germany—provided more than \$40 million each.

Contributions by donors: 2014–2018⁵

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)					
	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	Total
US	201.7	320.6	152.4	159.3	113.1	947.1
EU	108.1	67.6	76.9	23.5	85.7	361.8
UK	58.1	26.7	24.9	15.4	13.1	138.2
Norway	47.7	39.2	31.7	22.3	41.8	182.7
Germany	42.5	84.4	37.3	15.2	17.5	196.9
Japan	37.2	32.5	40.7	49.3	49.1	208.8
Denmark	23.4	15.5	10.2	9.2	12.1	70.4
Netherlands	19.4	19.2	25.2	22.1	25.9	111.8
Sweden	18.6	5.2	6.5	6.1	7.8	44.2
Switzerland	15.0	19.5	16.6	17.4	18.1	86.6
France	12.7	11.9	3.2	1.1	1.3	30.2
Canada	11.3	10.9	13.3	10.8	7.7	54.0
New Zealand	9.2	5.4	12.5	3.2	7.5	37.8
Australia	7.8	4.0	11.1	4.1	6.6	33.6
OCHA	6.1	1.6	4.1	0.4	0	12.2
Italy	4.3	3.9	2.8	3.0	2.2	16.2
Ireland	3.9	1.8	3.3	3.6	4.5	17.1
Belgium	3.3	0.9	2.9	0.3	3.2	10.6
Finland	3.2	3.3	0	5.5	8.0	20.0
China	2.5	0	0	0	0	2.5
South Korea	2.0	0.3	2.5	0.3	0.2	5.3
Austria	1.8	1.2	1.1	0.02	0.02	4.1
Luxembourg	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.5	7.2
Other donors*	1.4	19.3	2.4	2.8	3.8	29.7
Total	642.6	696.3	482.9	376.5	430.7	2,629.0

* Other donors in 2018 included: **Andorra, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovenia, Spain**, the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), and the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden.

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. OCHA = UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Another 10 donors contributed less than \$1 million each, six fewer compared to the 16 contributing donors in that range in 2017.

⁵ The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of international support for 2017 was updated as a result of revised France and US funding totals.

Support from States Parties in 2018 accounted for more than half of all donor funding, with 26 countries providing \$322 million. This represents an 11% increase from the \$288.9 million recorded in 2017.

In 2018, the EU and its Member States⁶ contributed a total of \$301.5 million and accounted for 47% of the total international support, up from the \$244.5 million provided in 2017 (35% of the total international funding for that year).

Twenty donors contributed more in 2018 than they did in 2017, including a \$40.5 million increase from the EU (60%), and a \$31.4 million increase from the UK (117%). Additionally, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden increased their assistance by more than \$7 million each. Two new donors were also identified in 2018: China and Cyprus.

In contrast, 11 donors decreased their funding, led by the US (down \$118.9 million, a 37% decrease) and Germany (down \$41.9 million, a 50% decrease).⁷ Additionally, six donors from 2017 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2018.

Summary of changes in 2018

Change	Donors	Combined total
Increase of more than \$10 million	EU, UK, and Sweden	\$85.3 million increase
Increase of less than \$10 million	Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, OCHA, and OPEC OFID	\$41.9 million increase
Decrease of more than \$10 million	Germany and the US	\$160.8 million decrease
Decrease of less than \$10 million	Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and UNA-Sweden	\$5.1 million decrease
New donors in 2018	China and Cyprus	\$2.5 million provided in 2018
Donors from 2017 that did not report new funding in 2018	Monaco, Portugal, Turkey, the Howard Buffett Foundation, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and the UN	\$17.3 million provided in 2017

The table opposite summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and US dollar terms, and shows the impact of the exchange rates on the US dollar value of international contributions:

- In US dollar terms, mine action international support rose in 11 countries and the EU, with the biggest percentage increases recorded in Sweden (+258%), the UK (+117%), and Australia (98%). In national currency terms, increases were recorded in nine countries and the EU and in most instances, they were less pronounced (with the exception of Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, where the increases were greater when expressed in national currency terms).

⁶ Eighteen EU Member States provided funding in 2018: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

⁷ These declines followed unusually large 2017 totals and were thus expected. At the Landmine Monitor briefing at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, the US (from the floor) and Germany (from the panel) both stated that such exceptionally high funding would not be repeated annually. Nevertheless both countries were among the five largest donors in 2018. Landmine Monitor Briefing, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26–30 November 2018.

- Consequently, whereas five states reported decreases in their mine action contributions in 2018, after conversion into US dollars, these reductions were either smaller in percentage terms or reversed by a slight increase, as was the case for Canada and the Netherlands.

Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US dollar terms⁸

Donors	Amount of decrease/increase (national currency)	% change from 2017	Amount of decrease/increase (US\$)	% change from 2017 (US\$)
US	-US\$118.9 million	-37%	-118.9 million	-37%
EU	+€31.6 million	+53%	+40.5 million	+60%
Germany	-€38.7 million	-52%	-41.9 million	-50%
Norway	+NOK64 million	+20%	+8.5 million	+22%
UK	+£22.7 million	+109%	+31.4 million	+117%
Japan	+¥467 million	+13%	+4.7 million	+15%
Denmark	+DKK45.3 million	+44%	+7.9 million	+51%
Netherlands	-€0.6 million	-4%	+0.2 million	+1%
Switzerland	-CHF4.5 million	-23%	-4.5 million	-23%
France	+€0.2 million	+2%	+0.8 million	+6%
Sweden	+SEK117.1 million	+265%	+13.4 million	+258%
Canada	-C\$0.6 million	-4%	+0.4 million	+4%
New Zealand	+NZ\$5.6 million	+74%	+3.8 million	+71%
Australia	+A\$5.3 million	+102%	+3.9 million	+98%
Italy	+€0.4 million	+9%	+0.5 million	+12%

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).

In 2018, contributions through UNMAS totaled \$99.8 million from 23 donors. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action.⁹ At least five donors, as well as the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), allocated \$2.4 million in 2018 through the ITF for mine action programs.

While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partnering institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies. Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2018 included Norwegian People's Aid (\$42.1 million), Mines Advisory Group (\$37.1 million), HALO Trust (\$35.8 million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (\$32 million), DanChurchAid

⁸ Average exchange rates for 2018: A\$1=US\$0.7481; C\$1.1957=US\$1; DKK6.3131=US\$1; €1=US\$1.1817; ¥110.4=US\$1; NZ\$0.6929=US\$1; NOK8.1318=US\$1; SEK8.6945=US\$1; CHF0.9784=US\$1; and £1=US\$1.3363. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 2 January 2019, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.

⁹ The small donors included Andorra, Cyprus, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Spain, as well as UNA-Sweden.

(\$26.6 million), Humanity & Inclusion (\$11.9 million), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (\$11.4 million).

RECIPIENTS

A total of 43 states and three other areas received \$569.7 million from 31 donors in 2018. A further \$72.9 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia, and Lao PDR—received 55% of all international support in 2018.

Iraq received the largest amount of funding (18% of all international support) from the largest number of donors (18). Fifteen states and one area, or 35% of all recipients, had only one donor.¹⁰

List of international support recipients in 2018

Recipients	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipients	Amount (US\$ million)
Iraq	116.4	Nepal	2.2
Global	72.9	<i>Western Sahara</i>	1.8
Afghanistan	71.8	Philippines	1.8
Syria	66.7	Chad	1.7
Croatia	49.9	Serbia	1.6
Lao PDR	46.4	Palau	1.5
Colombia	33.1	Georgia	1.5
Libya	27.5	Jordan	1.4
Lebanon	16.2	Albania	1.0
Vietnam	15.0	<i>Kosovo</i>	0.8
Cambodia	14.4	Thailand	0.8
Ukraine	11.9	<i>Somaliland</i>	0.8
South Sudan	11.4	Solomon Islands	0.6
Somalia	10.7	Guinea-Bissau	0.5
Yemen	9.3	Montenegro	0.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	8.2	Mali	0.4
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	7.8	Benin	0.4
Sri Lanka	7.3	Tunisia	0.1
Angola	7.1	Nigeria	0.1
Zimbabwe	6.1	Central African Republic (CAR)	0.1
Sudan	5.1	Marshall Islands	0.1
Myanmar	2.9	Senegal	0.03
Palestine	2.6	Turkey	0.008
Tajikistan	2.2	Total	642.6

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*.

More than two-fifths of international support (44%, or \$281.5 million) went to 10 countries

¹⁰ Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Tunisia, Turkey, and other area Somaliland.



Dog handler Ahmad Al Akhdar with his dog Brick in southern Lebanon.

© NPA, January 2019

and one other area with massive contamination.¹¹ Most of this funding went to clearance and risk education projects.

In 2018, 32 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2017, including 18 recipients receiving more support, and 14 recipients receiving less support, two of which received no support. These fluctuations may reflect shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations.

Afghanistan and Croatia were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively \$29.5 million and \$37.1 million more than in 2017. In addition, two countries saw a substantial increase in support received: Lebanon (\$9.4 million more) and Lao PDR (\$7.2 million more).

- Support to Afghanistan (\$71.8 million) increased by 70% in 2018. OCHA provided \$4.8 million to support mine action activities via UNMAS. Three donors considerably increased their contributions compared to 2017: the UK (\$16.4 million more), the Netherlands (\$4.4 million more), and Germany (\$2.4 million more).
- Support to Croatia jumped from \$12.9 million in 2017 to \$37.5 million in 2018, following the awarding of EU funding to support clearance activities. The EU was Croatia's sole international donor in 2018.
- Support to Lebanon (\$16.2 million) more than doubled from 2017. This was due to the increase in the US contribution (\$4 million provided in 2018 compared to \$1.5 million in 2017), the EU (\$5.3 million provided in 2018) and the UK (\$1.4 million provided) in order to support clearance and risk education operations.
- Support to Lao PDR (\$46.4 million) increased by nearly one-fifth in 2018, following increases in funding from Japan (about \$10 million more than in 2017), and the UK (\$1.3 million more than in 2017).

Iraq was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving \$86.9 million less than in 2017. Three additional countries experienced a high-value decline in support received in 2018: Colombia (\$35.3 million less), Syria (\$26.2 million less), and Chad (\$24 million less). These decreases were the result of changes in donors' contributions:

- Support to Iraq and Syria respectively dropped by 43% and 28%, as was expected after the massive contributions reported by Germany and the US in 2017. Support to Iraq in 2018 marked the return to a level of funding closer to that reported in 2016 (\$79.7 million).
- Support to Chad in 2018 (\$1.7 million) was 93% lower than funding in 2017, primarily due to a decline after massive EU contributions to support clearance activities with \$25.7 million provided in 2017.
- Support to Colombia (\$33.1 million) was reduced by more than half in 2018. The drop was mainly due to no new contributions reported by Japan (\$9.3 million provided in 2017) and the Howard Buffett Foundation (\$16.1 million provided in 2017). However, Colombia was the sixth largest country-recipient of mine action support.

¹¹ Massive contamination is defined by ICBL-CMC as more than 100km². Recipients of international support with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.

Summary of changes in 2018

Change	Recipients	Combined total
Increase of more than \$10 million	Afghanistan, Croatia, and “Global”	\$83.8 million increase
Increase between \$10 and \$1 million	Angola, Cambodia, DRC, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Vietnam	\$39 million increase
Increase of less than \$1 million	BiH, Jordan, Nepal, Palau, Palestine, Philippines, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, and Somaliland	\$6.9 increase
Decrease of more than \$10 million	Chad, Colombia, Iraq, and Syria	\$172.4 million decrease
Decrease between \$10 and \$1 million	Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Western Sahara	\$8.8 million decrease
Decrease of less than \$1 million	CAR, Georgia, Mali, Senegal, and Solomon Islands	\$3.3 decrease
Recipients from 2017 that did not receive new support in 2018	Azerbaijan and Mozambique	\$0.6 million received in 2017
New recipients in 2018	Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, Nigeria, Marshall Islands, Tunisia, and Turkey	\$1.7 million received in 2018

FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2018, 62% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while support to victim assistance represented 7% of the total international support to mine action.

“Various” funding represented 28% of all international support to mine action. This includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors.

Clearance and risk education

In 2018, \$396.9 million, or 62% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of \$7.4 million from 2017.

Four of the 10 largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, and Norway—provided three-quarters of all support to clearance and risk education (\$293.5 million).

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-one donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of \$123.1 million in 29 countries and two other areas.¹²

¹² States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Palau, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Signatory that received international assistance for clearance was: the Marshall Islands. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo and Somaliland.

Twelve donors reported contributions totaling \$9.3 million specifically for risk education projects in 16 countries.¹³ Syria received the most risk education-specific funding with \$2.7 million.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2018¹⁴

Sector	Total contribution (US\$ million)	% of total contribution	No. of donors	% of total dedicated contribution
Clearance and risk education	396.9	62%	26	93%
Various	182.6	28%	23	N/A
Victim assistance	44.7	7%	16	4%
Capacity-building	14.0	2%	15	2%
Advocacy	4.4	1%	13	1%
Stockpile destruction	0	0%	0	0%
Total	642.6	100%	N/A	

Note: N/A = not applicable. “Dedicated contribution” (non-various funding) totaled \$460million in 2018 and included funding set for a specific sector (advocacy, capacity-building, clearance, risk education, stockpile destruction, or victim assistance). The “0” in stockpile destruction in 2018 does not mean states expended no funds for that activity, but rather that none of the contributions reported in 2018 detailed dedicated stockpile destruction funding.

Victim assistance

Based on information available as of October 2019, direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2018 totaled \$44.7 million, up from \$27.7 million in 2017, and represented 7% of all reported support for mine action. While this represents an increase of \$17 million (up 61%) compared to 2017, as a proportion of all international support provided this remains within the 4–7% range observed since 2013.

Sixteen¹⁵ donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 12 States Parties, and five states not party.¹⁶ Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. The 2018 increase was the result of higher contributions from donors to victim assistance activities within the context of emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. However, there was a continuous and sharp decline in victim assistance support provided for most of the other affected countries where needs remain great and available resources are lacking, with nine out of the 17 recipients receiving less support in 2018 compared to 2017 (for a combined decrease totaling \$11million).

The top three victim assistance donors—the US, Germany, and New Zealand—provided 70% (\$31.2 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2018.

¹³ Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: CAR, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.

¹⁴ In 2017, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (\$404.3 million, or 58% of total international support), victim assistance (\$27.7 million, or 4%), capacity-building (\$11.2 million, or 2%), advocacy (\$3.6 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction (\$0 million, or 0%), and various activities (\$249.5 million, or 35%). Data for 2017 was revised—based on new figures that detailed dedicated clearance, risk education, and victim assistance funding, as well as contributions that were not previously reported by donors.

¹⁵ Victim assistance donors included: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

¹⁶ States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, and Syria.

In 2018, nearly half of all victim assistance support (48%) went to just four countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria—receiving a combined total of \$21.7 million. Thirty percent was provided to global activities (without a designated recipient state or area), and the remaining 22% went to victim assistance activities in 13 other countries.

Funding for victim assistance activities remains especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities, or are not able to provide specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding. Since such contributions are not disaggregated, it is not possible to include them in Monitor reporting. However, this annual estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

Advocacy and capacity-building

In 2018, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities (\$4.4 million).¹⁷ Of the 33 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 13 reported supporting advocacy activities.

Fifteen donors collectively provided \$14 million—1% of all international support—to support capacity-building activities in 15 countries.¹⁸

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2018

Overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States Parties such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as well as states not party India and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual expenditures.

Eight affected states reported \$56.9 million in contributions to mine action from their national budget in 2018, \$41.4 million less than the \$98.3 million reported in 2017, and far from the \$131.2 million reported in 2015.

National support: 2018

State	Contribution (US\$ million)
Angola	26.5
BiH	12.3
Lebanon	9.0
Chile	6.3
Chad	1.2
Zimbabwe	0.7
Lao PDR	0.6
Cambodia	0.3
Total	56.9

FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2014–2018


Over the past five years (2014–2018), total support to mine action amounted to \$3.2 billion, an average of about \$639 million per year.

Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted for about 18% of total mine action funding over the period and amounted to approximately \$565 million.

¹⁷ Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme (GMAP), the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

¹⁸ Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Palestine, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

Summary of contributions: 2014–2018




International support totaled \$2.6 billion, an average of \$525 million per year, and represented 82% of all support. Three donors—the US (\$947.1 million), the EU (\$361.8 million), and Japan (\$208.8 million)—contributed \$1.5 billion, nearly half of total international support. Four other donors—Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK—contributed more than \$100 million each.


Between 2014 and 2018, there were notable variations in allocations of international support:

- Dedicated clearance and risk education funding increased by 40%: rising from \$283.5 million in 2014 to nearly \$397 million in 2018. Over the period, more than three-fifths of international support went to clearance and risk education activities (64%, or \$1.8 billion).
- The volume of victim assistance funding totaled \$139.1 million and has grown from \$26.5 million in 2014 to \$44.7 million in 2018 (an increase of 6%). However, support to victim assistance accounted for just 5% of all international support over the period.
- “Various” funding increased by about \$110 million (150%) from \$73 million to \$182.6 million. In 2014, unearmarked and not disaggregated funding represented just 17% of all international support, compared to 35% in 2017 and 28% in 2018.
- Capacity-building remained more or less at the same level during the period with an average annual contribution of \$11.6 million.
- International support to advocacy activities dropped significantly from \$30.7 million in 2014 to \$2.2 million in 2015 (a 93% decrease) and has remained below \$5 million since.
- Donors did not report any new dedicated stockpile destruction funding since 2016.

International support by thematic sectors: 2014-2018



SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2018





Humanity & Inclusion mine clearance operation in Laos. The deminer is equipped with a metal detector. To his right, the red pickets delimit the land and characterize the contamination.

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STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign; rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 November 2019 there were 164 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)	Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00	Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01	Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02	Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99	Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99	Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99	Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98	Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00	Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)	Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
	Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02

Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
 Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
 Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
 Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
 Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
 Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
 Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
 Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
 Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
 Dem Rep of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
 Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
 Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
 Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
 Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
 El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
 Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
 Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
 Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
 Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
 Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
 Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)
 France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
 Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
 Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
 Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
 Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
 Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
 Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
 Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
 Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
 Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
 Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
 Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
 Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
 Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
 Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
 Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
 Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
 Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
 Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
 Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
 Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
 Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
 Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
 Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
 Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
 Macedonia, North 9 Sep 98 (a)
 Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
 Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
 Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
 Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
 Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
 Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
 Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
 Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
 Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
 Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
 Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
 Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
 Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
 Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
 New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
 Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
 Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
 Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
 Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
 Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
 Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
 Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)
 Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
 Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
 Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
 Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
 Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
 Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12
 Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
 Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
 Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
 Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00

Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98	Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99	Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01	Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98	Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98	Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03	Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98	Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)	Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00	Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01	Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99	Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98	Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)	Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98	United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)	Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99	Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)	Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03	Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02	Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
	Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

SIGNATORY

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

NON-SIGNATORIES

Armenia	Libya
Azerbaijan	Micronesia, Federated States of
Bahrain	Mongolia
China	Morocco
Cuba	Myanmar
Egypt	Nepal
Georgia	Pakistan
India	Russia
Iran	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Singapore
Kazakhstan	Syria
Korea, North	Tonga
Korea, South	United Arab Emirates
Kyrgyzstan	United States
Lao PDR	Uzbekistan
Lebanon	Vietnam

MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
 - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

- a) The duration of the proposed extension;
- b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
 - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
 - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
 - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
- c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
- d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
 - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
 - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
 - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
 - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 - e) Assistance to mine victims;
 - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

- a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
- b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
- c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
- d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
- e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
- f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
- g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
- h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
- i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this

Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting

State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
 - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
 - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
 - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

- a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
- b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
- c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
- d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

LANDMINE MONITOR 2019



Landmine Monitor 2019, the 21st annual Landmine Monitor edition, provides a global overview of efforts over the past 20 years, up to November 2019 where possible, to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assesses the international community's response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: Demining operations on a site in northern Chad. Since November 2018, when operations were launched, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) has demined 500,000m² (70 football fields). Due to the heat and heavy equipment, conditions for the 43 mobilized deminers are exhausting. These demining operations are part of a vast program to help the development of the region. © Gilles Loret/ HI, May 2019

Backcover: In Colombia, demining often takes place in remote and difficult to access areas, so deminers must trek long distances. © CCCM, 2019

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